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Abstract
This dissertation consists of three chapters. Chapter 1 examines the identification power
of assumptions that formalize the notion of complementarity in the context of a nonparamet-
ric bounds analysis of treatment response. I extend the literature on partial identification via
shape restrictions by exploiting cross–dimensional restrictions on treatment response when
treatments are multidimensional; the assumption of supermodularity can strengthen bounds
on average treatment effects in studies of policy complementarity. I combine this restriction
with a statistical independence assumption to derive improved bounds on treatment effect
distributions, aiding in the evaluation of complex randomized controlled trials. I show how
complementarities arising from treatment effect heterogeneity among subpopulations can be
incorporated through supermodular instrumental variables to strengthen identification of
treatment effects in studies with one or multiple treatments. I use these results to examine
the long–run effects of zoning on the evolution of land use patterns.
Chapter 2 considers the determinants of land use regulation. Zoning has been cited as a
discriminatory policy tool by critics, who argue that ordinances are used to deter the entry
of minority residents into majority neighborhoods through density restrictions (exclusion-
ary zoning) and locate manufacturing activity in minority neighborhoods (environmental
racism). However, identifying discrimination in these regulations is complicated by the fact
that land use and zoning have been co-evolving for nearly a century. We employ a novel
approach to overcome this challenge, studying the introduction of comprehensive zoning in
Chicago. We find evidence of a pre-cursor to exclusionary zoning as well as inequitable
treatment in industrial use zoning.
iii
Chapter 3 examines the impact of residential density and mixed land use on crime using
a unique high-resolution dataset from Chicago over the period 2008-2013. I employ a novel
instrumental variable strategy based on the city’s 1923 zoning code. I find that commercial
uses lead to more street crime in their immediate vicinity, with relatively weak spillovers.
However, this effect is strongly offset by density; dense mixed use areas are actually safer
than typical residential areas. Additionally, much of the commercial effect is driven by liquor
stores and late-hour bars. I discuss the implications for zoning policy.
iv
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Chapter 1
Complementarity and identification
1.1 Introduction
Complementarities arise naturally in many economic problems, often manifesting as policy
interactions or treatment effect heterogeneity among observed subgroups of a population.
This paper examines how assumptions that formalize the notion of complementarity can aid
in the identification of treatment effects. I employ a nonparametric bounds approach, where
identification is driven by qualitative restrictions rooted in economic theory or empirical ev-
idence rather than strong functional form or unconfoundedness assumptions. This approach
will yield interval estimates of parameters of interest; however, informative bounds are often
preferable to precise (but wrong) estimates obtained under incorrect assumptions. Partial
identification tools have been fruitfully applied to a wide range of empirical problems.1
In particular, I explore the identification power yielded by assuming that individual
treatment response functions exhibit supermodularity when treatments are multidimensional.
This assumption allows one to construct more informative bounds in studies of policy com-
1Examples of applied partial identification studies include: Giustinelli (2011) and Tsunao and Usui
(2014) on the returns to education, Kreider and Pepper (2007) on disability and employment,
Bhattacharya, Shaikh and Vytlacil (2008, 2012) on the mortality effects of Swan–Ganz catheterization,
Kreider and Hill (2009) on the effect of universal health insurance on medical expenditures, Pepper (2000) on
the intergenerational transmission of welfare receipt, Manski and Nagin (1998) on sentencing and recidivism,
and Gundersen, Kreider and Pepper (2012) on the health effects of the National School Lunch Program.
1
plementarity, which are typically stymied by the absence of pseudo–experimental variation
in the assignment of multiple treatments. I also show how complementarities arising from
interactions between treatment effects and observable covariates can be formalized as su-
permodular instrumental variables to improve bounds on average treatment effects. This
novel instrumental variable approach is broadly applicable to studies with one or multiple
treatments. Complementarity is frequently invoked in economics, but studies of its identifi-
cation power have been limited to very specific contexts. This paper develops general results
applicable to program evaluation in a wide range of empirical situations. I illustrate the
use of my results in an empirical application on the long–run effects of zoning on land use
patterns.
Typically, empirical studies seek to estimate the effect of a single treatment on one or
more outcome variables. However, the effect of a treatment may vary substantially with
the value of other (endogenously–determined) treatment variables. When policymakers have
multiple tools at their disposal, understanding how different policies enhance or offset each
other is crucial. If the positive impact of some policy intervention is substantially larger when
combined with a second (costly) intervention, a measure of the magnitude of this difference
is necessary for a proper cost–benefit analysis. The supermodularity and submodularity
assumptions I propose can aid in quantifying how policy impacts differ with the associated
policy environment.2
For example, unemployment relief is a multidimensional policy, involving a choice of both
potential benefit duration and the wage replacement rate. Lalive, Van Ours and Zweimu¨ller
(2006) show both theoretically and empirically that these two dimensions are complementary,
with simultaneous increases in both the replacement rate and potential benefit duration
leading to an increase in unemployment duration substantially larger than the sum of the
effects measured individually for particular subgroups. The Lalive et al. study exploits
2As more treatments are considered, the data are necessarily less informative about each individual
treatment. Thus, the researcher faces a trade–off where richer treatment spaces allow for more interesting
questions but generally lead to less precise answers.
2
variation in both dimensions of unemployment relief that has the characteristics of a natural
experiment, but such opportunities are very rare. Pseudo–experimental variation along
multiple policy dimensions is far less common than similar variation in individual policies.
This has arguably led to the overwhelming focus on the effects of policies in isolation. The
partial identification tools developed here, which are applicable in the absence of any unusual
pseudo–experimental policy variation, should enhance the ability of researchers to measure
treatment effect heterogeneity due to policy complementarities in a wide range of contexts.3
I illustrate the use of the shape restrictions developed here in a study of how the long–run
effect of commercial zoning on land use patterns varies with different restrictions on building
density.
Relatedly, responses to a treatment may differ among subpopulations defined by ob-
servable covariates. Many recent experimental studies have discussed the importance of
treatment effect heterogeneity between subgroups (Bitler, Gelbach and Hoynes 2006, 2008,
2014, Djebbari and Smith 2008, Feller and Holmes 2009). I show how qualitative informa-
tion about such treatment effect heterogeneity leads naturally to supermodular instrumental
variables, which can help narrow the bounds on average treatment effects in the same manner
as a traditional instrumental variable or a monotone instrumental variable.4 Supermodular
instrumental variables can be applied in the case of a single treatment or multiple treat-
ments, making them a potentially valuable addition to the range of identifying assumptions
available to applied researchers. I demonstrate their utility in the empirical illustration in
section 1.6.
While the bulk of the paper focuses on identification using non–experimental data, the
assumptions developed in this paper can be applied in the evaluation of complex randomized
controlled trials (RCTs) involving multiple treatments. In a discussion of program evalua-
3The sensitivity of effects to the surrounding policy environment may partly explain the wide variation
in estimates of treatment effects for similar policies in different contexts found in many literatures; see,
for example, the discussion in Lalive et al. (2006) on the effects of unemployment benefit policies on re–
employment rates. See also Gelman (2013) for a related discussion.
4See Manski and Pepper (2000) and section 1.4.
3
tion, Heckman, Smith and Clements (1997) note that, even in an RCT, many parameters of
interest are not point–identified, such as the proportion of the population receiving a treat-
ment who benefit from the treatment. Heckman et al. observe that classical probability
inequalities like the Fre´chet-Hoeffding copula bounds are not very informative. The struc-
tural supermodularity and submodularity assumptions I introduce have implications for the
entire distribution of treatment effects, so they can be used to obtain stronger bounds. Since
average treatment effects are identified in this context, the supermodularity or submodular-
ity of average effects can be established, and this can be used to provide some justification for
the stronger structural assumptions. Similarly, the validity of supermodular instrumental
variable assumptions can be established and used to justify stronger quantile supermodu-
lar instrumental variable assumptions, which can also be applied in the case of a single
treatment.
The literature on partial identification is extensive.5 Many of the contributions of
Charles Manski and coauthors are relevant to the results developed below; I review them
as appropriate. The literature on complementarity and identification is relatively small.
Molinari and Rosen (2008) connect supermodularity to identification in the context of game
estimation. They show that the approach of Aradillas-Lopez and Tamer (2008) applies to
games with supermodular payoff functions. Eeckhout and Kircher (2011) find that they
cannot identify (using wage data alone) whether or not the technology of a firm is super-
modular, i.e., whether or not more productive workers sort towards more productive jobs.
Graham, Imbens and Ridder (2014) analyze how reallocations of indivisible heterogeneous
inputs across production units (leaving a potentially complementary input fixed) may affect
average output. They discuss identification and estimation of the effects of a variety of corre-
lated matching rules. Lazzati (2014) uses monotone comparative statics to partially identify
treatment response in the presence of endogenous social interactions. Supermodularity arises
naturally in this context when individual outcomes are increasing with the outcomes of oth-
5See Manski (2003) for a comprehensive overview.
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ers. The shape restrictions I propose have been used in the context of estimation to improve
efficiency; Beresteanu (2005, 2007) considers the efficiency gains from imposing a variety of
restrictions, including supermodularity and submodularity.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 1.2, I outline the formal
setup used throughout the paper. In section 1.3, I present novel shape restrictions and the
resulting bounds on average treatment effects. In section 1.4, I discuss instrumental variable
assumptions and derive bounds on average potential outcomes and average treatment effects.
In section 1.5, I combine shape restrictions and instrumental variables with statistical inde-
pendence assumptions to derive bounds on cumulative distribution functions of treatment
effects. I conclude with an empirical illustration on the long–run effects of zoning on land
use patterns in section 1.6.
1.2 Notation and Setup
Individuals are drawn from a population I. The set I, the Borel σ–algebra of subsets of I
denoted by I, and the probability measure P together form a probability space (I, I, P ).
Every individual i ∈ I is associated with a vector of covariates xi ∈ X and a vector of
realized treatments zi ∈ T , where T is the treatment set.6 Since I focus on the identification
of treatment effects in the presence of multiple treatments, I will discuss in detail the structure
I adopt for the treatment space.
Definition. A nonempty partially ordered set V is a lattice if, for any v, v′ ∈ V ,
• V contains the join (least upper bound) of v and v′, denoted by v ∨ v′, and
• V contains the meet (greatest lower bound) of v and v′, denoted by v ∧ v′.
Examples of lattices include R2, Z × R, and {0, 1}n for n ∈ N. The meet and join
operations depend on the particular order imposed on the lattice; for example, the join
6I use superscripts to refer to individuals and reserve subscripts to denote vector components.
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of (2, 0) and (1, 1) in R2 is equal to (2, 1) under the product order and (2, 0) under the
lexicographic order. An element v of a lattice V is the top (bottom) of V if v′ ≤ v (v ≤ v′)
for all v′ ∈ V ; if v is not the top or bottom, it is in the interior. If the top (or bottom) of a
lattice exists, it is unique.
Definition. For a lattice V , a nonempty subset U ⊆ V is a sublattice of V if, for any
u, u′ ∈ U , U contains the meet and join of u and u′ in V .
Sublattices will be useful when I consider assumptions that do not hold globally on T .
The following assumption, which I maintain throughout the paper, describes the structure
imposed on the treatment space:
Assumption. The treatment space T is such that
• T ⊆ RL with L ∈ N,
• T is partially ordered under the product order, and
• T is a nonempty lattice.
The product order on T implies that t ≤ t′ iff tl ≤l t
′
l for each l. If t, t
′ ∈ T are
incomparable, i.e., tl < t
′
l and t
′
l′ < tl′ for some l, l
′, I write t ‖ t′. The advantage of the
lattice assumption is the notational clarity it provides when I employ supermodularity and
submodularity to formalize how the marginal effect on the response variable of changes in
some dimensions of the treatment depend on the values of other dimensions of the treatment.
This specification is flexible enough to allow for a wide variety of treatment types. In this
paper, I restrict attention to discrete treatments, as these are most commonly encountered in
practice. Dimensions of the treatment may be binary or multi–valued (Cattaneo 2010). Most
of the results extend straightforwardly to the case of continuous treatments. In practice,
however, the application to continuous treatments is hampered by the fact that, as the
number of treatments increases, the data alone are increasingly uninformative about the
effect of each individual treatment. The relationship between the complexity of the treatment
6
set and the amount that can be learned from the data is an issue I will discuss further in
the next section.
Every individual i is associated with a (measurable) response function yi (·) : T → Y ∈ R
mapping treatments into outcomes yi (t).7 zi ∈ T is the treatment that i actually receives,
so yi (zi) is individual i’s realized outcome, {yi (t)}t 6=zi are individual i’s counterfactual out-
comes, and {yi (t)}t∈T are individual i’s potential outcomes. Throughout the paper, I main-
tain the stable unit treatment value assumption,8 which says that individuals’ potential
outcomes {y (t)}t∈T do not depend on other individuals’ realized treatments (Rubin 1978).
1.3 Shape Restrictions
In this section, I explore the identifying power of shape restrictions that formalize comple-
mentarity and substitutability, with an emphasis on the identification of average treatment
effects. I review shape restrictions proposed in the previous literature before moving on
to the novel restrictions I propose. Using these assumptions, I derive bounds on average
treatment effects for both simple and complex treatment spaces.
Throughout, I assume that there exist K,K ∈ R such that K ≤ y (t) ≤ K for all t; these
are global bounds on response functions. As Manski (1990) observes, this is not as restrictive
as it seems; for example, if y is a probability, it is naturally bounded between zero and one.
In the absence of these global bounds, the results below will generally be uninformative.
All well–defined expectations are assumed to exist; if an expectation E [ y (t) | z = t′ ] is ill–
defined because the event z = t′ is off the support of z, I establish the convention that
E [ y (t) | z = t′ ]P (z = t′) ≡ 0.
Manski (1989) introduced the no–assumption bounds on E [ y (t) ]. The no–assumption
upper bound is the average of E [ y (t) | z = t ] and the global upper bound K, weighted
respectively by P (z = t) and P (z 6= t); likewise for the lower bound. Since they are typically
7I suppress i when referring to arbitrary response functions, covariates, or realized treatments.
8This assumption is alternatively referred to as noninterference by Cox (1958) and individualistic treat-
ment response by Manski (2013).
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wide, research has focused on other credible assumptions that yield additional identifying
power.
Manski (1997) studied the identification power of assumptions on the shape of individual
response functions; in particular, he considered restricting response functions to be mono-
tone, semi–monotone, or concave–monotone. I reproduce the semi–monotone treatment
response assumption here, in my notation:
Assumption SMTR (Semi–monotone treatment response). Response functions exhibit
semi–monotone treatment response on S ⊆ T if, for all t, t′ ∈ S,
t ≤ t′ =⇒ y (t) ≤ y (t′)
If S is a chain,9 then this assumption is referred to as monotone treatment response (MTR).
Manski (1997) uses this assumption to derive bounds on numerous quantities, includ-
ing average and quantile treatment effects. He motivated MTR by considering traditional
demand analysis, where researchers often make strong parametric assumptions but do not
exploit the less–controversial assumption that demand curves are downward sloping. SMTR
removes the need for a totally ordered T . It has the same identification power regardless
of whether T ⊆ R or T ⊆ RL for L > 1, except that in the latter case, it is possible that
t ‖ t′. Bhattacharya et al. (2008) derives bounds using SMTR without assuming a partic-
ular direction of monotonicity. Tsunao and Usui (2014) study the identification power of
concave–monotone treatment response combined with monotone treatment selection (dis-
cussed in section 1.4).
MTR and SMTR are within–dimension restrictions on the response functions. Additional
identification power can be obtained from cross–dimension restrictions, where the marginal
effect of a change in some dimensions of the treatment variable depends on the values of the
other dimensions:
9A subset S of a partially ordered set T is a chain if it is totally ordered under the inherited order.
8
Assumption SPM (Supermodularity). Response functions are supermodular on a sublat-
tice S ⊆ T if, for all t, t′ ∈ S,
y (t′) + y (t) ≤ y (t ∨ t′) + y (t ∧ t′) (1.3.1)
They are strictly supermodular when the inequality is strict.
Assumption SBM (Submodularity). Response functions are submodular on a sublattice
S ⊆ T if, for all t, t′ ∈ S,
y (t′) + y (t) ≥ y (t ∨ t′) + y (t ∧ t′) (1.3.2)
They are strictly submodular when the inequality is strict.
SPM is a formalization of the notion of complementarity. If two dimensions of a treat-
ment, say t1 and t2, are complementary, then the magnitude of the change in the response
variable due to an increase in t1 is increasing with t2. Thus, the two dimensions of the
treatment act to amplify each others marginal effects. In the case of a linear model
y = α + βt1 + δt2 + γt1t2 (1.3.3)
supermodularity is equivalent to the sign restriction γ > 0. SBM is a formalization of
substitutability, the case where elements of the treatment may mitigate each others effects.
Returning to (1.3.3), submodularity is equivalent to the sign restriction γ < 0. If both
supermodularity and submodularity hold, response functions are said to be modular. Since
these assumptions can be applied on sublattices of T , it is possible to allow some dimensions
of a treatment to be complements while those same dimensions are substitutes with other
dimensions.
As I discussed in the introduction, Lalive et al. (2006) study the Austrian labor market
and find that the two dimensions of unemployment relief, potential benefit duration and the
9
wage replacement rate, are complementary (strongly for some groups, weakly for others).
This finding could motivate the use of SPM in assessments of these and similar policies in
other contexts where the pseudo–random variation they exploit is absent.
Neumark and Wascher (2011) provide another example of policy complementarity in a
study on the interaction between the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) and the minimum
wage. They find that a higher minimum wage enhances the positive effect of the EITC on
the labor supply of single mothers; they find the opposite effect for childless individuals,
suggesting a crowding–out effect. These findings suggest that assumptions SPM and SBM,
respectively for each subgroup, could be applied in other studies on how the effect of minimum
wage changes are influenced by the EITC or similar programs.
Another naturally multidimensional policy is zoning. Zoning laws typically regulate many
aspects of the built environment; most broadly, they regulate both what types of uses are
allowed (commercial, industrial, etc.) and how densely land can be developed (lot coverage
of buildings, maximum height, etc.). The effects of specific zoning policies vary widely with
the overall policy bundle. Shertzer, Twinam and Walsh (2014b) study the long–run impact
of the initial zoning of Chicago on a variety of modern land use outcomes. The long–run
impact of historical commercial zoning on present–day commercial land use turns out to
hinge critically on the associated density restrictions; commercial zoning has a substantially
larger effect when paired with low–density zoning. This motivates the assumption of SBM
in the empirical application in section 1.6.
Since assumptions SPM and SBM can be applied on sublattices of T , it is possible to
allow some dimensions of a treatment to be complements while those same dimensions are
substitutes with other dimensions. For example, consider T = {0, 1}3 under the product
order. Assumption SPM on the two sublattices
S1 = {(1, 1, 0) , (1, 0, 0) , (0, 1, 0) , (0, 0, 0)}
S2 = {(1, 1, 1) , (1, 0, 1) , (0, 1, 1) , (0, 0, 1)}
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combined with assumption SBM on the five sublattices
S3 = {(1, 0, 0) , (1, 0, 1) , (0, 0, 0) , (0, 0, 1)}
S4 = {(1, 1, 0) , (1, 1, 1) , (0, 1, 0) , (0, 1, 1)}
S5 = {(0, 1, 0) , (0, 1, 1) , (0, 0, 0) , (0, 0, 1)}
S6 = {(1, 1, 0) , (1, 1, 1) , (1, 0, 0) , (1, 0, 1)}
S7 = {(1, 1, 0) , (1, 1, 1) , (0, 0, 0) , (0, 0, 1)}
yields complementarity between the first two dimensions of the treatment but substitutability
between the first two (individually and jointly) and the third.
An inspection of the no–assumption bounds reveals that the amount one can learn about
E [ y (t) ] or E [ y (t)− y (t′) ] from the data alone depends on P (z = t) and, in the latter case,
P (z = t′). If P (z = t) is small, the data are practically uninformative about E [ y (t) ].10
Thus, the researcher faces a trade–off where richer treatment spaces (which entail a larger
number of treatments) allow for more interesting questions but generally lead to less precise
answers. Adding “nuisance” dimensions to the treatment space that allow for the applica-
tion of additional SPM or SBM assumptions will generally not aid in the identification of
treatment effects of interest.
In propositions 1 and 2, I show how SPM and SBM can be used to compute bounds on the
expectations of average treatment effects. In general, these bounds will improve upon the no–
assumption bounds in the case of multidimensional treatments; with only a single treatment,
SPM and SBM have no identifying power. The simplest nontrivial lattice treatment space is
T = {(0, 0) , (1, 0) , (0, 1) , (1, 1)}, which corresponds to a two–dimensional binary treatment.
The following result shows the implications of supermodularity for identification on this
simple treatment space:
10In the case where one or more of the dimensions of the treatment are continuous, the data are neces-
sarily uninformative about almost all of the treatments. This motivates my restriction to discretely–valued
treatments.
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Proposition 1. Assume that T = {(0, 0) , (1, 0) , (0, 1) , (1, 1)}. Assume that SPM holds on
T . Then, the bounds
E [ y (1, 0) | z = (1, 0) ]P (z = (1, 0)) +KP (z 6= (1, 0))
−E [ y (0, 0) | z = (0, 0) ]P (z = (0, 0))−KP (z 6= (0, 0))
≤ E [ y (1, 0)− y (0, 0) ] ≤ (1.3.4)
E [ y (1, 1) | z = (1, 1) ]P (z = (1, 1)) + E [ y (1, 0) | z = (1, 0) ]P (z = (1, 0))
+KP (z ∈ {(0, 0) , (0, 1)})− E [ y (0, 1) | z = (0, 1) ]P (z = (0, 1))
−E [ y (0, 0) | z = (0, 0) ]P (z = (0, 0))−KP (z ∈ {(1, 0) , (1, 1)})
and
E [ y (1, 1) | z = (1, 1) ]P (z = (1, 1)) + E [ y (1, 0) | z = (1, 0) ]P (z = (1, 0))
+KP (z ∈ {(0, 0) , (0, 1)})− E [ y (0, 1) | z = (0, 1) ]P (z = (0, 1))
−E [ y (0, 0) | z = (0, 0) ]P (z = (0, 0))−KP (z ∈ {(1, 0) , (1, 1)})
≤ E [ y (1, 1)− y (0, 1) ] ≤ (1.3.5)
E [ y (1, 1) | z = (1, 1) ]P (z = (1, 1)) +KP (z 6= (1, 1))
−E [ y (0, 1) | z = (0, 1) ]P (z = (0, 1))−KP (z 6= (0, 1))
are sharp.11 The no–assumption bounds remain sharp for E [ y (1, 1)− y (0, 0) ] and each
average potential outcome E [ y (·) ] defined on T .
Proof of proposition 1. First, I show that SPM does not improve upon the no–assumption
bounds on potential outcomes. SPM implies that
yi (1, 0) + yi (0, 1) ≤ yi (1, 1) + yi (0, 0)
11There is no guarantee that these bounds will be nonempty; if an assumption implies that the bounds on
the parameter of interest are empty, the assumption is falsified by the data. This caveat applies to all the
results that follow.
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For each i, exactly one of these outcomes is observed. The unobserved terms may take any
value in
[
K,K
]
. When zi 6= (1, 0), there are three cases to consider. If zi = (1, 1), then
SPM implies
yi (1, 0) ≤ K ≤ yi (1, 1) +K −K
If zi = (0, 1), then
yi (1, 0) ≤ K ≤ K +K − yi (0, 1)
If zi = (0, 0), then
yi (1, 0) ≤ K ≤ K + yi (0, 0)−K
Thus, it follows that
yi (1, 0) ∈


{yi (1, 0)} if zi = (1, 0)
[
K,K
]
if zi ∈ {(0, 0) , (0, 1) , (1, 1)}
Taking expectations yields the no–assumption bounds. A similar argument applies to the
other elements of T .
The SPM inequality does permit strengthened identification results for treatment ef-
fects. In the no–assumption case, if zi = (1, 1) or zi = (0, 1), then yi (1, 0) − yi (0, 0) ∈[
K −K,K −K
]
. Under SPM, the fact that we observe one of {yi (1, 1) , yi (0, 1)} allows us
to further reduce this upper bound. Sharp bounds for the treatment effects yi (1, 0)−yi (0, 0),
yi (1, 1)− yi (0, 1), and yi (1, 1)− yi (0, 0) are given below.
yi (1, 0)− yi (0, 0) ∈


[
K − yi (zi) , K − yi (zi)
]
if zi = (0, 0)
[
yi (zi)−K, yi (zi)−K
]
if zi = (1, 0)
[
K −K,K − yi (zi)
]
if zi = (0, 1)
[
K −K, yi (zi)−K
]
if zi = (1, 1)
(1.3.6)
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yi (1, 1)− yi (0, 1) ∈


[
K − yi (zi) , K −K
]
if zi = (0, 0)
[
yi (zi)−K,K −K
]
if zi = (1, 0)
[
K − yi (zi) , K − yi (zi)
]
if zi = (0, 1)
[
yi (zi)−K, yi (zi)−K
]
if zi = (1, 1)
(1.3.7)
yi (1, 1)− yi (0, 0) ∈


[
K − yi (zi) , K − yi (zi)
]
if zi = (0, 0)
[
K −K,K −K
]
if zi = (1, 0)
[
K −K,K −K
]
if zi = (0, 1)
[
yi (zi)−K, yi (zi)−K
]
if zi = (1, 1)
(1.3.8)
Taking expectations in equations (1.3.6) and (1.3.7) yields the bounds in (1.3.4) and
(1.3.5), respectively. Equation (1.3.8) shows that the no–assumption bounds remain sharp
for E [ y (1, 1)− y (0, 0) ].
In proposition 1, assumption SPM improves the upper bound on E [ y (1, 0)− y (0, 0) ] and
the lower bound on E [ y (1, 1)− y (0, 1) ] by establishing a monotonicity relationship between
the two treatment effects. This monotonicity relationship implies that this assumption will
allow improvements in the bounds on one treatment effect (due to the imposition of other
assumptions) to further improve the bounds on other treatment effects. Because of this,
bounds computed jointly under SPM and other assumptions like monotone or supermodular
instrumental variables12 will generally be strictly contained within the intersection of the
bounds computed under these assumptions separately. The empirical application in section
1.6 illustrates this phenomenon. Thus, while SPM may have substantial identifying power
on its own, it may yield even more identifying power when combined with other assumptions.
In the special case where y is bounded between zero and one, SPM can establish that
12See section 1.4.
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E [ y (1, 0)− y (0, 0) ] ∈ [−1, 0] or E [ y (1, 1)− y (0, 1) ] ∈ [0, 1] if the observed expectations in
(1.3.4) and (1.3.5) take certain boundary values. In general, however, SPM is not sufficient
to identify the sign of a treatment effect in the absence of other assumptions.
Sharp bounds can be derived on general treatment spaces using the same approach, as I
show in proposition 2:
Proposition 2. Let {Sγ}γ∈Γ be the collection of all sublattices of T such that, for every
γ ∈ Γ, Sγ is not a chain and |Sγ| = 4. Define Γ
SPM ⊆ Γ to be the set of γ such that SPM
holds on Sγ and SBM does not hold on Sγ iff γ ∈ Γ
SPM ; likewise, define ΓSBM ⊆ Γ to be
the set of γ such that SBM holds on Sγ and SPM does not hold on Sγ iff γ ∈ Γ
SBM . Define
ΓMOD ⊆ Γ to be the set of γ such that both SPM and SBM hold on Sγ iff γ ∈ Γ
MOD. Let
ΓSPMt,t′ ⊆ Γ
SPM be the set of γ such that t, t′ ∈ Sγ and γ ∈ Γ
SPM ; likewise for ΓSBMt,t′
and ΓMODt,t′ . Then, for t
′ < t,
[
E [ y (t) | z = t ]−K
]
P (z = t) + [K − E [ y (t′) | z = t′ ]]P (z = t′)
+
∑
t′′∈Λ1∪Λ3
[
E [ y (t′′) | z = t′′ ]−K
]
P (z = t′′)
+
∑
t′′∈Λ4∪Λ5
[K − E [ y (t′′) | z = t′′ ]]P (z = t′′)
+
∑
t′′∈Λ2∪Λ6∪Λ7
[
K −K
]
P (z = t′′)
≤ E [ y (t)− y (t′) ] ≤ (1.3.9)[
K − E [ y (t′) | z = t′ ]
]
P (z = t′) + [E [ y (t) | z = t ]−K]P (z = t)
+
∑
t′′∈Λ1∪Λ2
[E [ y (t′′) | z = t′′ ]−K]P (z = t′′)
+
∑
t′′∈Λ4∪Λ6
[
K − E [ y (t′′) | z = t′′ ]
]
P (z = t′′)
+
∑
t′′∈Λ3∪Λ5∪Λ7
[
K −K
]
P (z = t′′)
where Λ1, . . . ,Λ7 are defined in (1.3.11). These bounds are sharp.
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Proof of proposition 2. By the Law of Iterated Expectations,
E [ y (t)− y (t′) ] =
∑
t′′∈T
E [ y (t)− y (t′) | z = t′′ ]P (z = t′′) (1.3.10)
Sharp bounds for the unidentified expectations on the right hand side of (1.3.10) will
yield sharp bounds on E [ y (t)− y (t′) ]. I proceed by finding the sharp identification region
for an arbitrary yi (t) − yi (t′) and every possible zi. These can be averaged to find sharp
bounds on E [ y (t)− y (t′) | z ] for all z. Define the following sets:
Λ1 =
{
t′′ | t′′ < t, t′′ ‖ t′, and ∃γ ∈ ΓMODt,t′ s.t. t
′′ ∈ Sγ
}
∪ {t′′ | t′ < t < t′′ and
either ∃γ ∈ ΓMODt,t′ s.t. t
′′ ∈ Sγ or ∃γ ∈ Γ
SPM
t,t′ , γ
′ ∈ ΓSBMt,t′ s.t. t
′′ ∈ Sγ ∩ Sγ′
}
Λ2 =
{
t′′ | t′′ < t, t′′ ‖ t′, and ∃γ ∈ ΓSBMt,t′ s.t. t
′′ ∈ Sγ
}
∪ {t′′ | t′ < t < t′′,
∄γ ∈ ΓMODt,t′ ∪ Γ
SBM
t,t′ s.t. t
′′ ∈ Sγ, and ∃γ ∈ Γ
SPM
t,t′ s.t. t
′′ ∈ Sγ
}
Λ3 =
{
t′′ | t′′ < t, t′′ ‖ t′, and ∃γ ∈ ΓSPMt,t′ s.t. t
′′ ∈ Sγ
}
∪ {t′′ | t′ < t < t′′,
∄γ ∈ ΓMODt,t′ ∪ Γ
SPM
t,t′ s.t. t
′′ ∈ Sγ, and ∃γ ∈ Γ
SBM
t,t′ s.t. t
′′ ∈ Sγ
}
Λ4 =
{
t′′ | t′ < t′′, t′′ ‖ t, and ∃γ ∈ ΓMODt,t′ s.t. t
′′ ∈ Sγ
}
∪ {t′′ | t′′ < t′ < t and (1.3.11)
either ∃γ ∈ ΓMODt,t′ s.t. t
′′ ∈ Sγ or ∃γ ∈ Γ
SPM
t,t′ , γ
′ ∈ ΓSBMt,t′ s.t. t
′′ ∈ Sγ ∩ Sγ′
}
Λ5 =
{
t′′ | t′ < t′′, t′′ ‖ t, and ∃γ ∈ ΓSBMt,t′ s.t. t
′′ ∈ Sγ
}
∪ {t′′ | t′′ < t′ < t,
∄γ ∈ ΓMODt,t′ ∪ Γ
SBM
t,t′ s.t. t
′′ ∈ Sγ, and ∃γ ∈ Γ
SPM
t,t′ s.t. t
′′ ∈ Sγ
}
Λ6 =
{
t′′ | t′ < t′′, t′′ ‖ t, and ∃γ ∈ ΓSPMt,t′ s.t. t
′′ ∈ Sγ
}
∪ {t′′ | t′′ < t′ < t,
∄γ ∈ ΓMODt,t′ ∪ Γ
SPM
t,t′ s.t. t
′′ ∈ Sγ, and ∃γ ∈ Γ
SBM
t,t′ s.t. t
′′ ∈ Sγ
}
Λ7 =
(
6⋃
j=1
Λj
)c
The four distinct orderings presented in Λ1, . . . ,Λ6 in (1.3.11) include every possible
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ordering that is compatible with the restriction that t′ < t and that also allows at least
one of SPM or SBM to have some implications for identification. Each of Λ1, . . . ,Λ6 is a
union of two sets. When t′′ is not comparable with exactly one of t, t′, there can be at most
one four–point sublattice containing t, t′, and t′′, since the incomparable treatments define
a unique meet and join. This simplifies the construction of the first set in each of these six
two–set unions. The first set in Λ1 isolates the t
′′ which belong to a sublattice containing t
and t′ where both SPM and SBM hold and where t′′ is not strictly larger or smaller than t′,
so it must be the case that t′ ∨ t′′ = t. Since both SPM and SBM hold on this sublattice, it
follows that
yi (t)− yi (t′) = yi (t′′)− yi (t′ ∧ t′′)
so that, when zi = t′′, the bounds
yi (t)− yi (t′) ∈
[
yi
(
zi
)
−K, yi
(
zi
)
−K
]
are sharp. A similar argument can be made for the first set in each of Λ2, . . . ,Λ6, and these
sets are mutually exclusive due to the particular combinations of order restrictions and γ
memberships along with the fact that
ΓMODt,t′ ∩ Γ
SPM
t,t′ = Γ
MOD
t,t′ ∩ Γ
SBM
t,t′ = Γ
SPM
t,t′ ∩ Γ
SBM
t,t′ = ∅
by definition.
The construction of the second set in each of the six two–set unions Λ1, . . . ,Λ6 is com-
plicated by the fact that the orderings t′ < t < t′′ and t′′ < t′ < t are compatible with
multiple four–point sublattices containing t, t′, and t′′, since there may be multiple t′′′ such
that t∨t′′′ = t′′ and t∧t′′′ = t′ (in the former case) and t′∨t′′′ = t and t′∧t′′′ = t′′ (in the latter
case). Each set is constructed to capture the t′′ whose sublattice membership(s) yield the
same implications for identification as the set it is paired with. The particular combinations
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of order restrictions and γ memberships imply that they are mutually exclusive.
The sets Λ1, . . . ,Λ6 define every sublattice membership pattern for t and t
′ for which SPM
and SBM may have any implications; this follows from proposition 1 and its straightforward
extension to the case of SBM. The set Λ7 contains those t
′′ such that either 1. any sublattice
Sγ containing t, t
′, and t′′ must have t′ as the bottom and t as the top, 2. t′′ does not belong
to any four–point sublattice containing t and t′, or 3. t′′ obeys one of the orderings from
Λ1, . . . ,Λ6 but does not belong to any sublattice containing t and t
′ on which at least one of
SPM and SBM hold .
The focus on four–point sublattices is without loss of generality, since the implications of
assumptions SPM and SBM only appear on four–point sublattices. SPM and SBM have no
implications on chains, so sublattices that are chains can be ignored. Restricting attention
to elements of {Sγ}γ∈Γt,t′
⊆ {Sγ}γ∈Γ is without loss of generality as well. This follows
from the fact that SPM and SBM have no implications for potential outcomes under the
maintained assumptions, and any implications for the treatment effect yi (t) − yi (t′) from
another treatment effect which are mediated by a third treatment effect are realized directly
on a sublattice containing the treatments from the first two treatment effects. To see this
concretely, suppose that Sγ = {t
′, t, t′′, t′′′} and Sγ′ = {t
′′, t′′′, t′′′′, t′′′′′} where t ‖ t′′, t′′′ ‖ t′′′′,
t′ = t ∧ t′′, t′′′ = t ∨ t′′, t′′ = t′′′ ∧ t′′′′, and t′′′′′ = t′′′ ∨ t′′′′. Suppose that SPM holds on both
Sγ and Sγ′ . This implies
yi (t)− yi (t′) ≤ yi (t′′′)− yi (t′′) ≤ yi (t′′′′′)− yi (t′′′′)
=⇒ yi (t)− yi (t′) ≤ yi (t′′′′′)− yi (t′′′′)
I show that {t′, t, t′′′′, t′′′′′} ∈ {Sγ}
γ∈ΓSPM
t,t′
; this follows directly from lemma 1 and the
definition of ΓSPMt′,t :
Lemma 1. Assume that t ‖ t′′, t′′′ ‖ t′′′′, t′ = t ∧ t′′, t′′′ = t ∨ t′′, t′′ = t′′′ ∧ t′′′′, and
t′′′′′ = t′′′ ∨ t′′′′. Then, t′′′′ ∧ t = t′ and t′′′′ ∨ t = t′′′′′.
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Proof. See appendix.
A similar argument applies for SBM.
The sets defined in (1.3.11) along with the arguments of proposition 1 yield the following
sharp identification regions for yi (t)− yi (t′) and each possible zi:
yi (t)− yi (t′) ∈


[
yi (zi)−K, yi (zi)−K
]
if zi ∈ {t} ∪ Λ1[
K −K, yi (zi)−K
]
if zi ∈ Λ2[
yi (zi)−K,K −K
]
if zi ∈ Λ3[
K − yi (zi) , K − yi (zi)
]
if zi ∈ {t′} ∪ Λ4[
K − yi (zi) , K −K
]
if zi ∈ Λ5[
K −K,K − yi (zi)
]
if zi ∈ Λ6[
K −K,K −K
]
if zi ∈ Λ7
(1.3.12)
Since the sets {t} , {t′} ,Λ1, . . . ,Λ7 are mutually exclusive and exhaustive, averaging the
bounds in (1.3.12) across i yields sharp bounds on E [ y (t)− y (t′) ] via (1.3.10). These sharp
bounds are given in (1.3.9).
Proposition 2 generalizes proposition 1 by allowing for a much richer set of treatments.
The treatment may have any finite number of dimensions, and each may be binary or multi-
valued. Some dimensions of the treatment may be complements while others are substitutes;
the result allows for arbitrary combinations of SPM and SBM as appropriate. The complex-
ity of the result is due to two factors. First, the treatment pair t, t′ may belong to multiple
sublattices. Second, the position of the treatment pair within a lattice, i.e., whether it
includes the top and/or bottom of the sublattice, differs across sublattices. The position
of the treatment pair within a sublattice combined with the assumptions that hold on the
sublattice determine whether the upper and/or lower bound (or neither) are improved.
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A number of the assumptions made in proposition 2 are primarily for ease of exposition
and interpretation and do not limit the generality of the result. For example, the assumption
that each Sγ has a cardinality of four is without loss of generality, since the implications of
assumptions SPM and SBM only appear on four–point sublattices. Similarly, no generality
is sacrificed by excluding sublattices that are chains, as SPM and SBM have no implications
on chains.
I have focused on bounding expectations of treatment effects using only supermodularity
and submodularity assumptions, but in practical applications these will often be paired
with other monotonicity and instrumental variable assumptions. Deriving sharp bounds
under combinations of assumptions is nontrivial. Applying results from section 1.4 to bound
E [ y (t)− y (t′) | z = t′′ ] for each t, t′, t′′ ∈ T before applying proposition 2 will yield bounds
that contain the true value but are not necessarily sharp. However, these bounds may be
much simpler to compute than the sharp bounds (which remain an open problem).
1.4 Instrumental Variables
Traditional instrumental variable (IV) analysis of treatment response relies on the exis-
tence of a variable that is correlated with the treatment variable of interest but is mean–
independent or independent of the distribution of response functions. Whether or not such
independence assumptions are justified in a particular context is often the subject of vigor-
ous debate. This has motivated researchers to find weaker and more credible forms of these
assumptions that still retain some identification power. A leading example is the notion of
a monotone instrumental variable (Manski and Pepper 2000, 2009):
Assumption MIV. xk is a monotone instrumental variable if, for all t, t
′ ∈ T and all x−k,
xk ≤ x
′
k =⇒ E [ y (t) | z = t
′, x = (xk, x−k) ] ≤ E [ y (t) | z = t
′, x = (x′k, x−k) ]
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Manski and Pepper motivated MIV by considering the problem of determining the re-
turns to schooling. Average wages should be weakly increasing with observable measures
of ability (such as test scores or realized years of schooling), so such measures can be used
as MIVs but not IVs. Giustinelli (2011) analyzes the returns to education in Italy using a
similar monotonicity restriction on the quantile function.
Assumption MIV can be generalized to allow xk to be partially ordered. Manski and Pepper
then refer to xk as a semi–monotone instrumental variable (SMIV). Another special case of
MIV occurs when the realized treatment z is itself an MIV; Manski and Pepper refer to
this as the monotone treatment selection (MTS) assumption. MIV and its generalizations
impose restrictions on functionals of potential outcome distributions. Restrictions can also
be imposed directly on functionals of treatment effect distributions:
Assumption SPMIV (Supermodular instrumental variable). xk is a supermodular instru-
mental variable for E [ y (t)− y (t′) | xk, x−k ] with t
′ ≤ t if
xk ≤ x
′
k =⇒ E [ y (t)− y (t
′) | xk, x−k ] ≤ E [ y (t)− y (t
′) | x′k, x−k ] (1.4.1)
for all x−k.
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SPMIV is an alternative formulation of complementarity where treatment effects vary
monotonically (on average) with an observed covariate xk.
14 An advantage of these assump-
tions is that evidence for their validity may be provided by previous studies where strong
identifying assumptions are credible due to controlled randomization or a natural experi-
ment. This evidence can motivate the application of these assumptions in other contexts
where similar identification strategies are not available. This contrasts with traditional IV
assumptions, which tend to be highly context–specific.
13The weak inequality in (1.4.1) can be reversed, in which case xk would be a submodular instrumental
variable. If the inequality is replaced with equality, xk becomes a modular instrumental variable.
14The SPM/SPMIV distinction is analogous to the MTR/MIV distinction discussed in Manski and Pepper
(2009).
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The Djebbari and Smith (2008) study of the heterogeneous impacts of the PROGRESA
conditional cash transfer program provides some examples of potential SPMIVs. PRO-
GRESA provided payments to households conditional on regular school attendance by the
household’s children as well as visits to health centers. Djebbari and Smith find that the im-
pact of this program on per capita consumption is substantially larger for poorer households
and households in more “marginal” villages, i.e., villages with greater rates of illiteracy, more
limited infrastructure, and a greater dependence on agricultural activities. Evaluations of
cash transfer programs in other contexts could make use of this information by using house-
hold poverty or village marginality as SPMIVs.
Further examples are provided by the Bitler et al. (2014) study of the impact of the
Connecticut Jobs First experiment. This program substantially lowered the marginal tax
rate on earnings below the poverty line for families on relief, relative to the existing Aid
to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program. In the Jobs First program, the
entire benefit package is terminated once earnings rise above the poverty line; this is in
contrast to the AFDC, where benefits decline linearly with earnings. Labor supply theory
clearly suggests that the impact of this alternative budget scheme should boost earnings
and employment much more for those who were previously out of work or whose earnings
left them far below the poverty line. These hypotheses are strongly borne out by the data,
suggesting that measures of pre–program earnings and employment could serve as SPMIVs
in studies of similar programs which are not implemented experimentally.
For the remainder of this section, let B (t, x) and B (t, x) be defined as
B (t, x) = E [ y (t) | z = t, x ]P (z = t | x) +KP (z 6= t | x) ∀t ∈ T, x ∈ X
and
B (t, x) = E [ y (t) | z = t, x ]P (z = t | x) +KP (z 6= t | x) ∀t ∈ T, x ∈ X
The following bounds can be derived using SPMIV:
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Proposition 3. Assume that xk is an SPMIV for E [ y (t)− y (t
′) | xk, x−k ] with t, t
′ ∈ T .
Then, the bounds
sup
x′
k
≤xk
{
B (t, x′k, x−k)− B (t
′, x′k, x−k)
}
≤ E [ y (t)− y (t′) | xk, x−k ] ≤
inf
xk≤x
′
k
{
B (t, x′k, x−k)− B (t
′, x′k, x−k)
}
(1.4.2)
are sharp.
As is the case for bounds derived under IV or MIV assumptions, inference is compli-
cated by the sup and inf operators in equation (1.4.2) (Manski and Pepper 2009). Ana-
log estimators of the bounds in (1.4.2) are consistent but biased in finite samples; the
estimated bounds will generally be too narrow. Fortunately, the methods developed by
Chernozhukov, Lee and Rosen (2013) can be applied to find bias–corrected estimates and
associated confidence intervals. Chernozhukov et al. discuss in detail the special cases of
estimating nonparametric bounds using instrumental variables and MIVs; the bounds in
(1.4.2) are essentially identical for the purposes of estimation, so their results can be applied
directly to my estimation problem. The theoretical extension allowing for multiple SPMIVs
is straightforward, and presents no novel estimation challenges besides those associated with
high–dimensional nonparametric conditioning.
Returning to assumption SPMIV: If the second inequality in (1.4.1) is reversed, xk be-
comes a submodular instrumental variable. If xk is a supermodular and submodular instru-
mental variable, i.e., average treatment effects are constant across different values of xk, then
xk is a modular instrumental variable. While this may seem like a strong assumption, it is
routinely employed in applied work that assumes both exogeneity of the treatment and no
interactions.
SPMIVs may also improve the bounds on functionals of potential outcome distributions,
as the following proposition illustrates:
Proposition 4. Assume that xk is an SPMIV for E [ y (t)− y (t
′) | xk, x−k ] with t, t
′ ∈ T .
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Then, the bounds
max
{
B (t, x) , sup
x′
k
≤xk
{
B (t, x′k, x−k)−B (t
′, x′k, x−k)
}
+ B (t′, x)
}
≤ E [ y (t) | xk, x−k ] ≤
min
{
B (t, x) , inf
xk≤x
′
k
{
B (t, x′k, x−k)−B (t
′, x′k, x−k)
}
+B (t′, x)
} (1.4.3)
and
max
{
B (t′, x) , B (t, x)− inf
xk≤x
′
k
{
B (t, x′k, x−k)−B (t
′, x′k, x−k)
}}
≤ E [ y (t′) | xk, x−k ] ≤
min
{
B (t′, x) , B (t, x)− sup
x′
k
≤xk
{
B (t, x′k, x−k)−B (t
′, x′k, x−k)
}}
(1.4.4)
are sharp.
As in the case of proposition 3, analog estimators of the bounds in (1.4.3) and (1.4.4)
are consistent but biased in finite samples; the Chernozhukov et al. approach can be applied
here as well.
1.5 Independence
Independence assumptions have been used to operationalize the belief that individuals’ re-
alized treatments are unrelated to any individual characteristics which may influence re-
sponses. This should be the case, for example, in a randomized controlled trial. I show how
statistical independence can be combined with shape restrictions and instrumental variables
assumptions to narrow the bounds on entire treatment effect distributions.
The familiar assumption of statistical independence of treatments and response functions
is defined in my notation as follows:
Assumption SI (Statistical independence). Potential outcomes are statistically independent
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of realized treatments if
P (y (t) | z) = P (y (t)) ∀t ∈ T
Assumption SI implies that the marginal distribution of y (t), denoted Ft, is point iden-
tified for all t ∈ T such that P (z = t) > 0. However, the distribution of y (t)− y (t′), whose
cumulative distribution function is denoted by Ft,t′ , is only partially identified. Makarov
(1982) was the first to derive pointwise sharp bounds on the distribution of the sum of two
random variables with fixed marginal distributions. Frank, Nelsen and Schweizer (1987)
derived these bounds in a simpler manner and extended them to allow for other opera-
tions such as differences and products as well as more than two variables. However, as
Kreinovich and Ferson (2006) show, these bounds are not sharp in the case of more than
two variables. The following result, taken from Theorem 2 of Williamson and Downs (1990),
gives the pointwise sharp bounds on the distribution Ft,t′ for any t, t
′ ∈ TR:
F t,t′ (w) = sup
u+v=w
{max {Ft (u)− Ft′ (−v) , 0}}
≤ Ft,t′ (w) ≤
1 + inf
u+v=w
{min {Ft (u)− Ft′ (−v) , 0}} = F t,t′ (w)
(1.5.1)
Fan and Park (2010) discuss consistent nonparametric estimation of these bounds.
SI can be combined with SPM to refine (1.5.1), as the following result shows:
Proposition 5. Assume that SI holds and that T = {t ∧ t′, t, t′, t ∨ t′} with t∧t′ < t, t′ < t∨t′.
Assume that SPM holds on T . Then, the bounds
F t∨t′,t (w) ≤ Ft∨t′,t (w) ≤ min
{
F t∨t′,t (w) , F t′,t∧t′ (w)
}
(1.5.2)
and
max
{
F t,t∧t′ (w) , F t∨t′,t′ (w)
}
≤ Ft,t∧t′ (w) ≤ F t,t∧t′ (w)
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are sharp, where F , F are defined as in (1.5.1).
Similar results can be derived for SBM, and these results can be used to obtain nar-
rower bounds on functionals of treatment effect distributions.15 These shape restrictions
could be justified by theoretical arguments; alternatively, since average treatment effects
are point–identified in this context, the supermodularity or submodularity of average effects
could be used to provide some justification for stronger structural assumptions. Extending
these results to general lattices is problematic due to the fact that sharp bounds on the
distribution function of a sum of more than two variables are an open question. Nonethe-
less, it is straightforward to collect all possible stochastic dominance relations implied by the
maintained assumptions, and bounds which contain the true value (but are not necessarily
sharp) can be obtained in a manner similar to that in proposition 5. Such bounds may be
useful in policy evaluation.
A reformulation of the SPMIV assumption can also be applied in this setting. SPMIV
itself is unhelpful, since conditional average treatment effects are point–identified. However,
if the distribution of treatment effects conditional on x is thought to obey a stochastic
dominance relationship in one or more covariates, this can be used to derive improved bounds.
The formal statement of the assumption is as follows:
Assumption Q–SPMIV (Quantile supermodular instrumental variable). xk is a quantile
supermodular instrumental variable for y (t)− y (t′) if
xk ≤ x
′
k =⇒ Ft,t′ (w | xk, x−k) ≥ Ft,t′ (w | x
′
k, x−k)
for all x−k.
The following proposition computes the bounds derived under this assumption:
15However, see Firpo and Ridder (2010) for a discussion of pointwise vs. uniform sharpness and the
implications for deriving sharp bounds on functionals of the distribution of treatment effects.
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Proposition 6. Assume that SI holds. Assume that xk is a Q–SPMIV for y (t)− y (t
′) with
t, t′ ∈ T . Then, the bounds
sup
xk≤x
′
k
{
F t,t′ (w | x
′
k, x−k)
}
≤ Ft,t′ (w | xk, x−k) ≤ inf
x′
k
≤xk
{
F t,t′ (w | x
′
k, x−k)
}
are sharp.
Again, since conditional average treatment effects are point–identified, they can provide
some evidence to support the validity of the stronger Q–SPMIV assumption. The improved
bounds on Ft,t′ derived using this result can be combined with SPM or SBM to yield even
stronger bounds.
1.6 Empirical Illustration
To illustrate the use of the identification results developed in this paper, I reanalyze data
from Shertzer et al. (2014b). That study examines the extent to which Chicago’s first zoning
ordinance, passed in 1923, influenced the evolution of the spatial distribution of commercial,
industrial, and residential activity in the city. That study found evidence of substantial
treatment effect heterogeneity, which motivates the use of SBM and SPMIV assumptions in
the analysis below.
Chicago’s 1923 zoning ordinance regulated land by restricting uses and density; for de-
tails on the ordinance, consult Shertzer et al. (2014b). Here, I bound the effects of 1923
commercial zoning on the probability that a city block will contain any commercial activity
in 2005, focusing on the outlying (largely residential) portions of the city that were zoned
into the two lowest density categories. As discussed in section 1.3, zoning is a multidimen-
sional policy and the long–run effect of commercial zoning likely varies substantially with
the associated density restrictions. Since both use and density zoning are endogenous policy
variables, quantifying the heterogeneous effects of commercial zoning with respect to den-
sity requires a multidimensional treatment variable; simply conditioning on assigned density
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zoning would not yield correct estimates of how the commercial zoning effect varies with
density zoning.
Formally, the outcome variable yi (·) is an indicator equal to 1 iff city block i contains
any commercial activity in 2005. yi is a function of a treatment t ∈ T = {0, 1}×{1, 2}. The
first dimension of t is equal to 1 if the block received any commercial zoning in 1923 and
0 otherwise. The second dimension of t is equal to 1 if the block was zoned for the lowest
density development (3 or fewer stories) and 2 if it was zoned for higher density development
(8–10 stories).
Areas zoned for lower densities will be more residential in character and contain a larger
proportion of single–family homes (Shertzer et al. 2014b). It is well documented that residen-
tial property owners (especially single–family homeowners) generally oppose the encroach-
ment of commercial uses and have substantial power to block such development (Fischel
2001). It is likely that the early establishment of commercial activity through zoning will be
a more important determinant of future commercial land use in areas also zoned for lower
densities. This assumption is also consistent with previous literature showing that mixed use
areas are more likely to see conversion to completely non–residential use than strictly resi-
dential use (McMillen and McDonald 1991). This motivates the assumption that y exhibits
SBM on T .
One may also expect commercial zoning to have more persistent effects when it does not
conflict with the existing land use pattern. The data identifies blocks which had commercial
activity prior to the introduction of zoning; an indicator for the presence of pre–zoning
commercial activity is a natural SPMIV.
Table 1.1 shows a series of bounds computed under different assumptions. It is noteworthy
that the bounds under the combination of SBM and SPMIV are not simply the intersection
of the bounds computed under these assumptions separately. This illustrates the fact that
the shape restrictions I introduce can magnify the identifying power of other assumptions.
While the sign of the treatment effect is not identified using only these assumptions, there
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Table 1.1: Bounds on long–run zoning impact
Bounds on:
Assumptions: E [ y (1, 1)− y (0, 1) ] E [ y (1, 2)− y (0, 2) ]
None [−0.686, 0.934] [−0.573, 0.807]
SBM [−0.259, 0.934] [−0.573, 0.741]
SPMIV [−0.532, 0.934] [−0.573, 0.747]
SBM & SPMIV [−0.231, 0.934] [−0.573, 0.512]
Observations 8,572 8,572
The outcome variable y is an indicator for the presence of commercial activity on the block in
2005. The first dimension of the treatment is an indicator that equals one iff the block received
any commercial zoning in 1923. The second dimension of the treatment indicates the density level
the block was zoned for in 1923.
is up to a 28% reduction in the width of the bounds.
1.7 Conclusion
In this paper, I contribute to the literature on the partial identification of treatment effects
by developing and applying assumptions that formalize the notion of complementarity. I
examine the identification power of these assumptions and discuss how they can be justi-
fied. The supermodularity and submodularity assumptions I propose can be used to narrow
bounds on treatment effects in studies of policy complementarity, which have traditionally
been stymied by a lack of pseudo–experimental variation in multiple policies simultaneously.
In proposition 1, I show how these shape restrictions can improve bounds on average treat-
ment effects in the simple case of a two–dimensional binary treatment. Proposition 2 extends
this result to a more general treatment set with an arbitrary finite number of (possibly mul-
tivalued) treatments and the possibility of complex combinations of supermodularity and
submodularity.
Complementarity may also stem from differential treatment response among subpopu-
lations defined by observed covariates. Subgroup heterogeneity in treatment effects is an
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increasingly widely recognized phenomenon, and can often be motivated directly from eco-
nomic theory (see, e.g., Bitler et al. (2014)). Propositions 3 and 4 show how qualitative
information about treatment effect heterogeneity embodied in supermodular instrumental
variables can be used to improve bounds on average treatment effects and average potential
outcomes. Supermodular instrumental variables can be used in studies with one or many
treatments, making them a versatile and potentially powerful addition to the arsenal of
applied econometricians.
The assumptions I propose can be useful in the experimental context as well. Propo-
sition 5 shows how supermodularity can be combined with an assumption of statistical
independence between assigned treatments and responses to yield improved bounds on the
cumulative distribution function of a treatment effect. These results can be applied to the
evaluation of outcomes in complex (multi–treatment) randomized controlled trials, which are
increasingly prevalent in many fields, including development economics. Since average treat-
ment effects are point–identified in this context, one can determine if average responses ex-
hibit supermodularity or submodularity. This can provide evidence that individual response
functions are supermodular or submodular. Similarly, the behavior of (point–identified)
conditional average treatment effects can motivate the use of a quantile supermodular in-
strumental variable; in proposition 6, I show how this assumption can strengthen the bounds
on the CDF of a treatment effect distribution.
Bounds derived under the assumptions I propose here are of interest only to the extent
that such assumptions are considered credible. Where might evidence for their validity
come from? Arguments for policy complementarity may be provided by economic theory,
as in Lalive et al. (2006), or they may come from multi–treatment randomized controlled
trials. Evidence on subgroup heterogeneity in treatment effects may be provided by previous
studies where strong identifying assumptions are credible due to controlled randomization
or a natural experiment. In such studies, conditional average treatment effects are point–
identified, so the validity of the assumptions I propose can be established. This can motivate
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their use in other contexts where similar identification strategies are not available. This
distinguishes supermodular IV assumptions from traditional IV assumptions, since the latter
tend to be context–specific.
The empirical illustration in section 1.6 employs assumptions SBM and SPMIV to study
the impact of historical zoning on the evolution of land use in Chicago. Of particular interest
is the fact that the bounds computed under both SBM and SPMIV are substantially nar-
rower than the intersection of the bounds computed under each assumption separately. This
demonstrates the general fact that assumptions SPM and SBM can magnify the identification
power of other assumptions.
1.8 Appendix
Proof of lemma 1. I first show that t′′′′ ∧ t = t′:
t′′′′ ∧ t′′′ = t′′
=⇒ (t′′′′ ∧ t′′′) ∧ t = t′′ ∧ t
=⇒ t′′′′ ∧ (t′′′ ∧ t) = t′
=⇒ t′′′′ ∧ t = t′
where the last implication follows from the fact that t ≤ t′′′. Now, I show that t′′′′ ∨ t = t′′′′′:
t′′′ ∨ t′′′′ = t′′′′′
=⇒ (t ∨ t′′) ∨ t′′′′ = t′′′′′
=⇒ t ∨ (t′′ ∨ t′′′′) = t′′′′′
=⇒ t ∨ t′′′′ = t′′′′′
where the last implication follows from the fact that t′′ ≤ t′′′′.
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Proof of proposition 3. In the absence of other assumptions, the bounds
B (t, x) ≤ E [ y (t) | x ] ≤ B (t, x)
and
B (t′, x) ≤ E [ y (t′) | x ] ≤ B (t′, x)
and thus
B (t, x)− B (t′, x) ≤ E [ y (t) | x ]− E [ y (t′) | x ] ≤ B (t, x)−B (t, x)
are sharp for all x ∈ X. The assumption that xk is an SPMIV for E [ y (t)− y (t
′) | xk, x−k ]
implies that
B (t, x′k, x−k)− B (t
′, x′k, x−k) ≤ E [ y (t)− y (t
′) | xk, x−k ]
for all x′k ≤ xk and
E [ y (t)− y (t′) | xk, x−k ] ≤ B (t, x
′
k, x−k)−B (t
′, x′k, x−k)
for all xk ≤ x
′
k. The result follows.
Proof of proposition 4. Proposition 3 implies that the bounds
sup
x′
k
≤xk
{
B (t, x′k, x−k)−B (t
′, x′k, x−k)
}
≤ E [ y (t)− y (t′) | xk, x−k ] ≤
inf
xk≤x
′
k
{
B (t, x′k, x−k)−B (t
′, x′k, x−k)
}
are sharp. Thus, E [ y (t) | x ] and E [ y (t′) | x ] must simultaneously satisfy the no–assumption
bounds
B (t, x) ≤ E [ y (t) | x ] ≤ B (t, x) (1.8.1)
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and
B (t′, x) ≤ E [ y (t′) | x ] ≤ B (t′, x) (1.8.2)
as well as
sup
x′
k
≤xk
{
B (t, x′k, x−k)−B (t
′, x′k, x−k)
}
+ E [ y (t′) | x ]
≤ E [ y (t) | x ] ≤
inf
xk≤x
′
k
{
B (t, x′k, x−k)−B (t
′, x′k, x−k)
}
+ E [ y (t′) | x ]
(1.8.3)
and
E [ y (t) | x ]− inf
xk≤x
′
k
{
B (t, x′k, x−k)−B (t
′, x′k, x−k)
}
≤ E [ y (t′) | x ] ≤
E [ y (t) | x ]− sup
x′
k
≤xk
{
B (t, x′k, x−k)−B (t
′, x′k, x−k)
}
(1.8.4)
From (1.8.1)–(1.8.4), it is clear that
max
{
B (t, x) , sup
x′
k
≤xk
{
B (t, x′k, x−k)− B (t
′, x′k, x−k)
}
+ B (t′, x)
}
≤ E [ y (t) | xk, x−k ] ≤
min
{
B (t, x) , inf
xk≤x
′
k
{
B (t, x′k, x−k)−B (t
′, x′k, x−k)
}
+B (t′, x)
}
and
max
{
B (t′, x) , B (t, x)− inf
xk≤x
′
k
{
B (t, x′k, x−k)− B (t
′, x′k, x−k)
}}
≤ E [ y (t′) | xk, x−k ] ≤
min
{
B (t′, x) , B (t, x)− sup
x′
k
≤xk
{
B (t, x′k, x−k)−B (t
′, x′k, x−k)
}}
must hold. I show that these bounds are feasible, i.e., consistent with (1.4.2), whence it
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follows that they are sharp. Consider the following events:
max
{
B (t, x) , sup
x′
k
≤xk
{
B (t, x′k, x−k)−B (t
′, x′k, x−k)
}
+B (t′, x)
}
= sup
x′
k
≤xk
{
B (t, x′k, x−k)−B (t
′, x′k, x−k)
}
+ B (t′, x) > B (t, x)
(1.8.5)
min
{
B (t, x) , inf
xk≤x
′
k
{
B (t, x′k, x−k)− B (t
′, x′k, x−k)
}
+ B (t′, x)
}
= inf
xk≤x
′
k
{
B (t, x′k, x−k)− B (t
′, x′k, x−k)
}
+B (t′, x) < B (t, x)
(1.8.6)
max
{
B (t′, x) , B (t, x)− inf
xk≤x
′
k
{
B (t, x′k, x−k)−B (t
′, x′k, x−k)
}}
= B (t, x)− inf
xk≤x
′
k
{
B (t, x′k, x−k)− B (t
′, x′k, x−k)
}
> B (t′, x)
(1.8.7)
min
{
B (t′, x) , B (t, x)− sup
x′
k
≤xk
{
B (t, x′k, x−k)− B (t
′, x′k, x−k)
}}
= B (t, x)− sup
x′
k
≤xk
{
B (t, x′k, x−k)−B (t
′, x′k, x−k)
}
< B (t′, x)
(1.8.8)
It is easy to show that (1.8.5) =⇒ ¬(1.8.7); thus, the lower bounds in (1.4.3) and (1.4.4) are
consistent with (1.4.2). Similarly, (1.8.6) =⇒ ¬(1.8.8), and so the upper bounds in (1.4.3)
and (1.4.4) are consistent with (1.4.2).
Proof of proposition 5. For a lattice T = {t, t′, t ∨ t′, t ∧ t′} which is not a chain, SPM implies
the following inequalities:
yi (t′)− yi (t ∧ t′) ≤ yi (t ∨ t′)− yi (t)
yi (t)− yi (t ∧ t′) ≤ yi (t ∨ t′)− yi (t′)
yi (t) + yi (t′)− 2yi (t ∧ t′) ≤ yi (t ∨ t′)− yi (t ∧ t′) ≤ 2yi (t ∨ t′)− yi (t)− yi (t′)
Since these inequalities hold for all i ∈ I, they imply the following first–order stochastic
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dominance relationships:
Ft∨t′,t (w) ≤ Ft′,t∧t′ (w) (1.8.9)
Ft∨t′,t′ (w) ≤ Ft,t∧t′ (w) (1.8.10)
Ft∨t′,t,t∨t′,t′ (w) ≤ Ft∨t′,t∧t′ (w)
Ft∨t′,t∧t′ (w) ≤ Ft,t∧t′,t′,t∧t′ (w)
for all w ∈ R. Here, Ft∨t′,t,t∨t′,t′ is the cdf of 2y (t ∨ t′) − y (t) − y (t′) and Ft,t∧t′,t′,t∧t′ is the
cdf of y (t) + y (t′)− 2y (t ∧ t′). Pointwise sharp bounds on Ft∨t′,t, Ft∨t′,t′ , Ft′,t∧t′ , Ft,t∧t′ , and
Ft∨t′,t∧t′ in the absence of SPM are given by (1.5.1). Combining SPM with the inequalities
(1.8.9) and (1.8.10) yields the results.
Proof of proposition 6. Trivial.
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Chapter 2
Race, ethnicity, and discriminatory
zoning
(with Allison Shertzer and Randall Walsh)
2.1 Introduction
Few local policies are as controversial or as frequently linked to discrimination as zoning.
Critics argue that zoning is used as a tool to deter entry of poorer households into wealth-
ier neighborhoods, often through the imposition of minimum lot sizes.1 According to this
view, low–income minority households become trapped in poor neighborhoods as a result of
“exclusionary” zoning, contributing to racial segregation and disparities (Schlay and Rossi,
1981; Rothwell and Massey, 2009). Scholars and policy makers also argue that zoning is used
to steer industrial activity towards minority neighborhoods, leading to disproportionate toxic
exposure and depressed land values (Maantay, 2001; Wilson, Hutson, and Mujahid, 2008).
“Environmental racism” associated with zoning could thus serve as a channel through which
minorities remain disadvantaged and isolated.2
1For reviews of the exclusionary zoning literature, see Ihlanfeldt (2004) and Pogodzinski (1991).
2The term “environmental racism” was coined by Reverend Benjamin Chavis during a press release
regarding the influential report “Toxic Waste and Race in the United States: A National Report on the
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Research continues to demonstrate that minorities remain disproportionately isolated in
poor neighborhoods and exposed to pollution (Sharkey, 2013; EPA Plan EJ 2014).3 However,
identifying the link between local land use regulations and these disparities is difficult because
land use and zoning have been co–evolving for almost a century in most American cities.
Existing scholarship has struggled to disentangle inequitable treatment in zoning ordinances
and nuisance siting from residential mobility that is correlated with land use. For instance,
the availability of affordable housing may cause low–income residents to cluster in areas with
locally undesirable land uses (Been and Gupta, 1997). Nonetheless, understanding the link
between zoning and disparities in access to public goods and exposure to pollution is critical
for effective policymaking.
In this paper we employ a novel approach to studying how land use regulations affect
minorities, focusing on the introduction of comprehensive zoning in the United States. The
key innovation of our approach is that we observe detailed measures of existing land use at
the city block level prior to the introduction of comprehensive zoning in Chicago. Our empir-
ical strategy asks what impact pre–existing minority populations had on zoning outcomes,
conditional on the extant land use and settlement patterns at the time of initial zoning adop-
tion. The ability to control for ex ante density allows us to distinguish between minority
neighborhoods receiving higher density zoning and the tendency of minorities to settle in
neighborhoods with denser development. Similarly, the ability to observe and control for ex
ante minority proximity to undesirable land uses enables us to disentangle discrimination in
land use regulation from the observationally equivalent mechanism of poor minorities sorting
into less expensive neighborhoods near polluting sites.4
We focus on the initial comprehensive zoning ordinance adopted by Chicago in 1923,
Racial and Socioeconomic Characteristics of Communities with Hazardous Waste Sites” (United Church of
Christ, 1987).
3For the EPA see “Plan EJ 2014” see http://www.epa.gov/compliance/ej/plan-ej/.
4Recent work by Depro, Timmins and O’Neil (2014) takes a different approach to this question, estimating
a structural model of mobility by race in the presence of polluting sites. They show that race–pollution
correlations can be in part explained by whites having a higher marginal willingness than Hispanics to pay
to avoid pollution exposure.
37
one of the first and most influential policies of its kind, and ask how the racial and ethnic
composition of neighborhoods influenced local zoning outcomes. A second contribution of
our study is the rich detail of the microdata assembled for the analysis. We observe place
of birth and parents’ place of birth for the universe of individuals living in Chicago in 1920,
allowing us to precisely measure the size of both first– and second–generation immigrant
populations. We are also able to distinguish northern–born black populations from enclaves
of southern–born blacks who had migrated to Chicago, which enables us to ask whether
these groups were treated differently in the zoning process.
We first study the density component of the zoning ordinance, finding evidence of an
early form of “exclusionary” zoning that was applied to black neighborhoods.5 On the
margin between the two lowest levels of density zoning, where the greatest scope for unequal
treatment in density restrictions would have existed, a one standard deviation increase in
the black share of a neighborhood was associated with a 16 percentage point increase in
the likelihood of the neighborhood being zoned primarily for higher density buildings. For
European immigrants, the relationship is reversed. Thus, at the margin, the zoning board
appears to have endeavored to increase the building density in neighborhoods with high
numbers of black residents and decrease the density in neighborhoods with large numbers of
European immigrants.
Turning to the use component of the zoning ordinance, we find that neighborhoods with
a larger share of southern–born blacks or first–generation immigrants were more likely to be
zoned for industrial uses than comparable neighborhoods with white natives. Specifically, a
standard deviation increase in southern black share is associated with a 8 percentage point
increase in the likelihood of an enumeration district being zoned to include manufacturing
uses, and a one standard deviation increase in the first–generation immigrant share is asso-
ciated with a 5 percentage point increase in the likelihood of an enumeration district being
5The extant literature on exclusionary zoning emphasizes differences in zoning ordinances across various
incorporated municipalities, not within a single city (for instance, The Homevoter Hypothesis, Fischel, 2001).
However, to the extent that cities faced pressure to concentrate minorities in particular neighborhoods, we
may expect to see higher density zoning in black and immigrant neighborhoods in our context.
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zoned for manufacturing uses. These are quantitatively important effects given that only 26
percent of enumeration districts received any zoning for manufacturing uses.
Inequitable zoning had consequences in both the short and long run for blacks and im-
migrants. Minority communities receiving industrial use and higher density zoning were
excluded from the economic benefit of low density, purely residential zoning in the 1923
ordinance.6 Zoning thus served as a channel through which government action reduced the
value of minority–owned homes relative to the properties owned by white native–born in-
dividuals. Discrimination in zoning ordinances translates directly into economic disparities
since “for the great majority of homeowners, the equity in their home is the most important
savings they have.” (Fischel, 2001, p. 4). We also show that conditional on pre–zoning land
use, neighborhoods that received higher density zoning in 1923 had higher housing unit and
population density by 1940. This finding buttresses the claim that zoning ordinances can
be used to concentrate minorities in denser neighborhoods, contributing to segregation and
environmental disparities (Rothwell, 2011). Furthermore, we demonstrate that this type of
discriminatory policy had emerged as early as the 1920s.
Our results cast doubt on the de jure racial blindness of comprehensive zoning ordinances,
of which all but one (New York) were passed after the Supreme Court ruled explicitly racial
zoning unconstitutional in the 1917 Buchanan v. Warley case. Although our evidence is
historical, the results demonstrate that racial discrimination can arise even with the most
general and widely used forms of land use control. Furthermore, Shertzer, Twinam, and
Walsh (2014) find that these ordinances have persistent effects on a city’s economic geography
today. Because minority enclaves also exhibit substantial persistence over time, the results
of these papers taken together indicate that observed inequities today could partially result
from zoning decisions made many decades in the past.
6The price premium for strictly residential use zoning in the context of the Chicago ordinance is docu-
mented in McMillan and McDonald (2002). In order for blacks to be disadvantaged by the impact of the
zoning ordinance on housing prices, it must be the case that some were homeowners and landlords. We
cannot observe landlord status in the census, but nonetheless we see that 7 percent of blacks in our sample
region were homeowners in 1920 and 10 percent in 1930.
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2.2 Background on Zoning in Chicago
2.2.1 Brief History of Zoning in Chicago
The origins of comprehensive land use regulation in Chicago were rooted in public demand
for “orderly” urban development, in particular the prevention of industrial and commercial
encroachment on residential neighborhoods. Early twentieth century observers, including
the influential Chicago Real Estate Board, expressed concern about the effect of unchecked
expansion of commercial and industrial activity on property values (Schwieterman and Cas-
pall, 2006). Others objected to the “canyon effect” created by unbroken rows of skyscrapers
and the potential negative effects of the associated reduction in sunlight exposure and air
flow on public health (Hall, 2002).
Chicago’s city government had made previous attempts to control undesirable land uses,
including an 1837 municipal code that prohibited any landowner or tenant from maintaining
certain nuisances such as dead animals, dung, putrid meat, or fish entrails on their prop-
erty. However, such piecemeal approaches proved insufficient for meeting public demand for
controlled development, and in 1920 the newly created Chicago Zoning Commission began
preparing a comprehensive zoning ordinance. The Commission, composed of eight aldermen
and fourteen representatives from the Chicago community, spent eighteen months surveying
existing land use in Chicago before issuing the initial statute.
Chicago’s comprehensive zoning ordinance regulated land through both use districts and
volume districts. Four distinct use districts were included: residential (single family housing),
apartment, commercial, and manufacturing. These use districts were hierarchical, with
apartment districts allowing residential uses, commercial districts allowing both apartments
and single–family homes, and manufacturing districts allowing any use. Volume districts
imposed restrictions on maximum lot coverage, aggregate volume, and height. The five
volume districts in Chicago’s ordinance were also hierarchical with district 5 allowing the
tallest buildings.
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Zoning statutes spread across the country in rapid order after Chicago’s ordinance was
passed, and by 1925 nearly 500 cities had adopted similar forms of comprehensive land
use regulation (Mills, 1979). By this time, the question of whether zoning could explicitly
address race and block black residents from certain neighborhoods had been settled: the U.S.
Supreme Court had ruled a Louisville, Kentucky racial zoning ordinance unconstitutional
in Buchanan v. Warley in 1917. This case squashed an effort by the Chicago Real Estate
Board to convince the city to adopt a similar racial zoning ordinance. The realtors, led by
agents from the Hyde Park, Kenwood, and Oakland neighborhoods, had argued that the
dispersion of African–Americans throughout the city could lead to more than $250 million
(in 1922 dollars) in property value depreciations (Chicago Commission on Race Relations,
1922).
When the move for a racial zoning ordinance failed, demand for segregation and protec-
tion from black “encroachment” led to the proliferation of private alternatives such as re-
strictive covenants (Brooks, 2011; Brooks and Rose, 2013). White residents were concerned
by the arrival of blacks from the South, seeing them as “ignorant and rough–mannered,
entirely unfamiliar with the standards of conduct in northern cities” (Chicago Commission
on Race Relations, 1922). White immigrants were also concerned about competition for
jobs from newly arrived African Americans and viewed the prospect of Negro neighbors as
a “catastrophe equal to the loss of their homes” (Grossman, 1989, p. 175). Even longtime
black residents of Chicago were hostile to the new arrivals, worrying that they would lose
what social privileges they had as a result of the influx of poor and uneducated southern
blacks into the city (Kennedy, 1968, p. 222).
For their part, African Americans were suspicious of the movement for comprehensive
zoning, particularly so soon after the racial zoning debate. Nonetheless, the 1923 zoning ordi-
nance passed without notable opposition from the black community in Chicago. Enthusiasm
from black elites, many of whom optimistically welcomed the move for comprehensive zoning,
may partly explain this outcome. For instance, a prominent African American developer on
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the zoning board, Charles S. Duke, championed land use regulation to the black community
and is credited by historians for having shielded the wealthiest black neighborhoods from
mixed–use zoning (NAACP, 1923). Secondary historical sources indicate that City Council
in Chicago may have deliberating lowered zoning standards (e.g. permitted higher building
density and mixed uses) in poorer black neighborhoods while maintaining strict zoning in
white neighborhoods to prevent “encroachment” of blacks (Flint, 1977). However, to our
knowledge there is no empirical evidence regarding the presence of racial animus in either
the 1923 ordinance or subsequent amendments over the 1930s and 1940s.
2.2.2 Related Empirical Work on Zoning in Chicago
Although to our knowledge we are the first scholars to empirically ask how the spatial
distribution of minority populations shaped initial zoning ordinances, comprehensive land
use regulation is the subject of a large literature, and the case of Chicago has attracted
particular interest. Previous work on Chicago’s 1923 zoning ordinance used a sample of city
blocks to determine the extent to which the ordinance followed existing uses, finding that
zoning patterns were highly predictable given existing land uses, proximity to transportation
networks, and distance to waterways (McMillen and McDonald, 1999). The same authors
also asked how the 1923 zoning ordinance impacted land values (McMillen and McDonald,
2002). Using propensity score matching on the same sample of city blocks, they find that
strictly residential zoning increased land values relative to mixed–use zoning.
2.3 Data
The dataset used in this paper has three components: 1920 census data at the enumeration
district level, the comprehensive 1922 Chicago land use survey, and a map of the city’s 1923
zoning ordinance. Summary statistics for key predictors and outcomes are provided in Table
2.1.
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Table 2.1: Summary statistics.
2.3.1 Census Enumeration District Data
We obtained counts of the number of blacks and white ethnic group members at the census
enumeration district level for a 100 percent sample of the population using a digitized version
of the original 1920 Census taken from the genealogy website Ancestry.com. Enumeration
districts were small administrative units used internally by the Census to divide cities into
small areas that could be surveyed by one person.7 The spatial microdata compiled for
this paper represents a significant improvement over existing sources, most of which are
tabulations of the population at the ward level produced by the Census Bureau.8 The
average enumeration district in Chicago had 1,182 individuals in 1920, less than two percent
7The Census Bureau did not switch to a mail–based survey system until 1960.
8The IPUMS sample for 1920 (Ruggles et al, 2004) covers 1 percent of the population of Chicago and
contain enumeration district identifiers; however, this small sample is insufficient for studying neighborhoods.
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of the population of the average ward.
In order to investigate the relationship between the composition of the population and
zoning outcomes, we digitized the 1920 enumeration district map of Chicago. We first used
written descriptions of the enumeration districts available on microfilm from the National
Archives. The information from these microfilms has been digitized and made available on
the web due to the work of Stephen P. Morse.9 Second, we took digital photographs of
the physical map of the 1920 census enumeration districts of Chicago from the National
Archives. Working primarily with a geocoded (GIS) historic base street map developed by
the Early Indicators Project, we generated a GIS representation of the Chicago enumeration
district map that is consistent with the historic street grid.10
In our empirical work we focus on four categories of racial and ethnic minorities. Given
the emphasis in the historical record on the lack of cohesiveness between northern and
southern blacks, we separate these two groups in much of our empirical work. We define as
southern blacks those individuals who report their race as black or mulatto and their place of
birth as in the South.11 We also include in the southern black category “second–generation”
blacks, that is, individuals born in the North but with southern–born fathers in order to
group all blacks of southern origin together. Northern blacks are defined as black or mulatto
individuals who were both born outside the South with fathers born outside the South.
First–generation immigrants include all foreign–born individuals plus second–generation
individuals under the age of 18, the latter of whom are presumably children residing in the
same household as their foreign–born parents. Second–generation immigrants are defined as
individuals who were born in the U.S. and who are at least 18 years old with foreign–born
fathers. Using these definitions, we avoid a standard problem in the segregation literature of
immigrant populations being diluted by the presence of their native–born children (see Cut-
9Website: http://stevemorse.org/ed/ed.php.
10See “Historical health conditions in major US cities: The HUE dataset” (Villareal, Bettenhausen, Hanss,
Hirsch) for details on the street file construction.
11We use an eleven state definition of the South, defining the region to include Alabama, Arkansas, Florida,
Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia.
44
Figure 2.1: Spatial distribution of the minority groups.
ler, Glaeser, and Vigdor, 2008). Third–generation whites are defined as white individuals who
were born in the U.S. and whose fathers were born in the U.S. As is shown in Table 2.1, the
population of our study area is composed of 1.5 percent northern blacks, 2.9 percent south-
ern blacks, 52.0 percent first–generation immigrants, and 17.9 percent second–generation
immigrants in 1920. The remainder are white third–generation and beyond natives.
There are important compositional and economic differences between the first– and
second–generation immigrant groups. Adult second–generation immigrants primarily traced
their ancestry to Ireland and Germany and tended to be wealthier than recent arrivals. First–
generation immigrants were more likely to have arrived from Poland, Italy, Russia, Bohemia
(now the Czech Republic), and the other “new” sending countries of the late nineteenth and
early twentieth century European immigration. The German and Irish communities also held
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political clout and most aldermanic seats; the larger new immigrant groups had mobilized
politically but counted few aldermen among their number (Centennial List of Mayors, City
Clerks, City Attorneys, City Treasurers, and Aldermen, 1937). We may thus expect first
and second–generation immigrants to have been treated differently by the zoning process.
Figure 2.2: Variation in northern and southern blacks.
The spatial distribution of the minority groups we study is displayed in Figure 2.1.12
Panel A shows the concentration of southern–born blacks in the “Black Belt” south of
downtown with a secondary population to the west. Northern–born blacks appear to be
concentrated in the Black Belt as well, but with larger numbers living to the north and south
of the most densely African American areas. Figure 2.2 graphically illustrates the variation
in where northern and southern blacks lived in finer detail, with a close up view of the black
12The two blank areas are the result of missing data. We had to omit 84 enumeration districts (out of
1884) from our sample: 36 were missing from Ancestry.com’s database and 48 had illegible or missing land
use maps, leaving us with 1800 observations.
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neighborhoods to the south and west of downtown. Focusing exclusively on enumeration
districts that were at least 5 percent black, the figure shows the spatial distribution in the
percentage of each neighborhoods’ black population that we classify as being southern black.
As is clear from the figure, the southern black composition of these neighborhoods ranges
from a low near 20 percent to a high in excess of 80 percent. We thus find there is sufficient
variation in where southern and northern blacks lived to examine their impact on zoning
separately.
Turning to European immigrants, Panels C and D of Figure 2.1 show the distribution
of first– and second–generation immigrants, respectively. Numerically much larger than the
black population, first–generation immigrants were most concentrated in inland neighbor-
hoods in the periphery of the central business district. Second–generation immigrants occupy
the next ring of enumeration districts further out from the downtown, particularly in the
northwest.
2.3.2 The 1922 Chicago Land Use Survey
The comprehensive land use survey we draw upon was conducted by the Chicago Zoning
Commission in 1922 for the purposes of informing the drafting process for the zoning ordi-
nance. Four teams, each equipped with an automobile, recorded the use of every building
and lot in the city (Zoning Chicago 1922 Pamphlet). From these survey maps we obtain the
location of every commercial and manufacturing use in the city; we also obtain the location
and number of stories for every building with four or more stories. We geocoded the largest
sample to date of this pre–zoning survey for our study. While previous work by McMillen
and McDonald used a sample of 1000 blocks, we digitized nearly two–thirds of the city by
land mass.13 Our sample covers 79.4 percent of the 1920 population along with 97.8 percent
of blacks and 80.8 percent of first–generation immigrants. Figure 2.3 provides a graphical
illustration of the land mass covered by our sample.
13Our sample covers 64 percent of the 1920 area of Chicago and 56 percent of the current (2013) city area.
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Figure 2.3: Sample area.
Figure 2.4 provides a map image of several blocks from the survey. The Tilden Public
School in the center of the image is surrounded by noxious facilities, indicated by “++N”
on the map. The building heights of all structures over four stories can also be seen (sur-
veyors occasionally indicated three–story buildings although not consistently). The letters
on buildings correspond to specific uses, which we classified as residential, commercial, or
manufacturing (further distinguished by subclass) using the same system as the Chicago
Zoning Commission in 1922. Of particular interest to our study are the various manufactur-
ing classes: A and B include general manufacturing that does not cause a nuisance but may
require yard storage, class S includes large–scale industrial facilities such as rail yards and
granaries, class D covers storage of explosives and high pressure gases, and class C includes
manufacturing facilities that emit noise, smoke, odors, or pose a fire risk. We consider the
noxious facilities in classes C separately in much of our analysis (only one instance of Class
D manufacturing exists in our sample). Commercial use is indicated using only one category
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and covers retail establishments, offices, and entertainment venues such as theaters.
Figure 2.4: Land use map sample.
2.3.3 Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance of 1923
We digitized the initial zoning ordinance for the same broad sample of Chicago as the land
use survey, recording both volume zoning and use zoning. The volume districts in the
zoning ordinance are essentially rough concentric rings radiating out from the central business
district. Figure 2.5.A shows the digitization of these districts with each enumeration district
assigned to the volume district most common within its borders. Our empirical work focuses
on the two outermost rings, which were volume districts 1 and 2. Under zoning for volume
district 1, buildings were capped at 5 to 6 stories and could cover only 50 percent of an
interior lot. In volume district 2, apartment buildings could reach 12 to 13 stories and cover 60
percent of the lot. However, the effective difference in height and density limitations between
these two districts was actually much greater due to restrictions on overall building volume.
The volume district 1 maximum building height was effectively 33 feet, corresponding to
roughly three stories, while in district 2 the maximum height was effectively 8 to 10 stories.
The inner three volume districts allowed buildings with effective heights of 11, 16, and 22
stories, respectively, and were found only in the central business district and surrounding
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areas (see Figure 2.5.A). There were no density “minimums,” only restrictions only the
maximum volume, height, and lot coverage.
Figure 2.5: Volume and use zoning.
Use zoning delineated the city into four distinct districts: residential (single–family
homes), apartment, commercial, and manufacturing. These use districts were hierarchi-
cal, with apartment districts allowing residential uses, commercial districts allowing both
apartments and single–family homes, and manufacturing districts allowing any use.14 The
residential category was rarely used in the initial zoning ordinance; only three percent of
the enumeration districts in our sample have any zoning of this type. Figure 2.5.B shows a
section of a use zoning map from an area west of the downtown along the Chicago River.
Zones for apartments, commercial activity, and manufacturing can all be seen.
2.4 Empirical Approach
Our empirical approach relies on the ability to observe the same land use data employed
by the Chicago Zoning Commission when they drafted the ordinance. We pose two ques-
tions in our empirical work. First, how were minorities sorted across the city and within
14There were additional gradations within the commercial and manufacturing districts, with certain ob-
jectionable commercial uses barred if they were within 125 feet of a residential or apartment district, while
certain manufacturing uses were barred if they were within 100 to 2000 feet of a residential, apartment, or
commercial district. Some commercial uses within 125 feet of residential or apartment districts also saw
restrictions on the hours during which trucking activities could occur.
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neighborhoods with respect to existing land use and urban geography prior to the zoning
ordinance? Second, accounting for geography and extant land use, what was the impact of
various minority populations on zoning outcomes?
Crucial to the identification of the second question is that we sufficiently account for other
causes of zoning that also influenced the demographic composition of enumeration districts.
By conditioning on an extensive array of spatial, land use, and transportation variables, our
empirical strategy attempts to block all “back–door” paths from our demographic variables
to zoning outcomes (Pearl, 2009). In the language of Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), we
render the non–demographic causes of zoning “conditionally ignorable,” and so the effect
of demographic composition on zoning outcomes is identified. Recognizing the limits of our
ability to block all alternate mechanisms via controls, we attempt to further verify our main
results using a series of robustness checks in Section VI.
The models we estimate are all single index models, i.e., functions of a linear combination
x′β of our covariates. To permit nonlinearities in responses, we frequently allow covariates
to enter through indicators as well as polynomials. Specifically, spatial variables such as
distance to the central business district, distance to the nearest major street, distance to
Lake Michigan, distance to the nearest river, distance to the nearest railroad, and distance
to an ancillary railroad all enter as quartic polynomials, and we include indicators that
equal one whenever an enumeration district is proximate to any of these features. We also
include quartic polynomials for population density and the area of the enumeration districts.
Indicators for overlapping a railroad or major street are included, as is a quartic polynomial
for the distance to the nearest railroad.
To control for existing land use, we include variables measuring the density of commercial
uses, warehouses, and each of the five different manufacturing use classes; these enter as both
indicators and quadratic polynomials in the density of each type of use. To account for large
industrial sites, we add an indicator equal to one if the enumeration district includes a
contiguous area greater than 800,000 square feet (approximately four city blocks) populated
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by heavy industrial activity. We include separate indicators for enumeration districts that
overlap the Union Stockyards and those that are within 1,000 feet of the Stockyards. To
capture the industrial character of the area surrounding an enumeration district, we also
include counts of different manufacturing uses in 500 and 1,000–foot rings around each
enumeration district. To account for the existing distribution of building heights, we include
the densities of four, five, six, seven, eight, nine, and ten story buildings. We also include the
density of eleven through twenty–five story buildings; disaggregating this category has little
impact on the analysis due to the concentration of these buildings in the central business
district.
To address the possibility that recent immigrants and black migrants located in cheaper
areas of the city that were also suitable for manufacturing activity, we include as a control a
measure of land values transcribed by Gabriel Ahlfeldt and Daniel McMillen from the 1913
edition of Olcott’s Blue Books.15 Specifically, this variable is the average land value per front
foot based on 125 foot tracts (see McMillen, 2012). As a further control for wealth, we use
the head of household variable in the census to develop an income measure based on live–in
hired help. For each enumeration district, we count the number of household heads as well
as the number of individuals who report being a maid, cook, servant, or laborer in relation to
the head of house.16 We then compute the ratio of live–in hired help to heads of household
and include this value in our regressions. We also include ward fixed effects to account for
differential political influence exerted by alderman. There are approximately 51 enumeration
districts per ward in our sample. Finally, to measure home neighborhood motivations for
the zoning board members, we added an indicator for whether a zoning board member lived
15Land prices may have influenced zoning directly; for example, the zoning board may have considered
areas with cheaper land to be more suited for large–scale industrial uses. Land prices may also proxy
for unobservable neighborhood characteristics. Since both racial and ethnic composition and unobservable
neighborhood characteristics can be expected to have had a causal effect on land prices, conditioning on
land prices may induce a correlation between these variables even if they are unconditionally independent.
This “collider–stratification” could bias the estimation of our coefficients of interest (Greenland 2003, Pearl
2009). However, despite the fact that land prices are strongly correlated with both our explanatory and
outcome variables, their inclusion has a negligible effect on our coefficient estimates.
16We do not observe occupation in the Ancestry.com data, relation to head of house is our only opportunity
to measure household employment status.
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in the enumeration district.17
We measure zoning outcomes using both continuous and discrete variables as appro-
priate. For example, we assess the probability that an enumeration district contains any
manufacturing zoning as well as the percentage of the enumeration district that is zoned for
manufacturing uses. When the outcome is a binary indicator, we typically report results from
a probit model in terms of average marginal effects. We consider only discrete outcomes for
density zoning because there are relatively few enumeration districts straddling the relevant
density zone borders. Each enumeration district is assigned to the volume district in which
most of its area falls. When considering continuous outcomes, we typically report results
from a Tobit model, which assumes the existence of an underlying variable that equals the
index x′ plus a normally distributed error term. The observable value of the latent variable
is equal to zero if the latent variable is below zero; similarly, it is equal to one if the latent
variable exceeds one. This model accounts for the fact that EDs receiving boundary values
may differ substantially in their suitability for different types of zoning.18
Our baseline specification is thus
%orindicatorforzoningtypei = f (x
′
iβ + wardi) + ǫi
where the zoning type is manufacturing or commercial and xi includes the extensive list
17Only one enumeration district with a board member received any industrial zoning. We explored a
variety of political representation indicators in our analysis, including whether a ward’s alderman served on
the zoning board. We found small and insignificant results on manufacturing zoning for all variables relating
to local representation on the board.
18In the Tobit model, β is the marginal effect of x on the underlying latent variable; the marginal effect
over the uncensored range is obtained by multiplying this β by a shrinkage factor, which explains why it
is generally larger than the estimates we obtain from the OLS specifications (McDonald and Moffit, 1980).
An alternative estimation procedure involves fitting a beta distribution whose parameters are a function of
our covariates. However, this is inappropriate since we observe many values at the boundary, and these
values are discarded when estimating the parameters of the beta distribution because there is no support
on the boundary. Papke and Wooldridge (1996) recommend the fractional logit estimation procedure in this
context. The fractional logit estimator is a generalized linear model where the conditional expectation of
the outcome variable is equal to the logit function evaluated at the index x′iβ. This ensures that the output
from the model is always bounded between zero and one. As a robustness check, we also estimated all of the
continuous dependent variable models reported here using the fractional logit specification. These results
were qualitatively similar to those reported in the paper. For parsimony, we only report the OLS and Tobit
results.
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of spatial and land use controls described above as well as measures of the share of the
enumeration district population composed of blacks, the share composed of first–generation
immigrants, and the share composed of second–generation immigrants. We use robust stan-
dard errors throughout the analysis (White, 1980).19 We also decompose the black share
into southern– and northern–born blacks in much of the analysis.
2.5 Existing Patterns of Minority Residential Location
We begin by documenting the distribution of minority location across the city and within
neighborhoods with respect to measures of urban density, proximity to commercial and man-
ufacturing activity, and proximity to other demographic groups. We employ two approaches
to measure pre–existing sorting associated with land use. First, we report the exposure to
various uses experienced by the average member of each demographic group we study. Sec-
ond, we regress a variety of land use variables on demographic composition along with basic
spatial controls to understand the relationship between demographics and pre–existing land
uses.
Table 2.2 reports the average exposure results. The first two columns of Panel A report
the average number of four story and four to ten story buildings per acre experienced by
the average member of each demographic group we study. Southern–born blacks had the
highest exposure to both categories of tall structures, followed by northern blacks and then
first–generation immigrants. However, first–generation immigrants experienced the highest
population density (column 3). The ordering is similar for commercial enterprises per acre,
noxious facilities per acre (defined as the number of Manufacturing class C uses), and general
manufacturing facilities per acre (defined as Manufacturing classes B, C, and S uses) with
both black groups and first–generation immigrants having the highest exposure (columns
4–6). Although industrial facility exposure was essentially equal across groups, southern
19Using the method of Conley (1999) to construct standard errors robust to spatial autocorrelation con-
sistently resulted in smaller standard errors, which we do not report here.
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Table 2.2: Average exposures.
blacks and first–generation immigrants were exposed to more noxious industrial uses than
other groups (.007 uses per acre compared with .006 for northern blacks and .0046 for
second–generation immigrants).
Minority exposure to other demographic groups is shown in Panel B. As we would ex-
pect, both northern and southern blacks live in enumeration districts with larger shares of
other blacks. However, the sum of share northern and share southern black faced by the
average southern black is only .64. We interpret this result as evidence that blacks were not
completely segregated by race; we also note that many black individuals served as live–in
maids in white neighborhoods and would have been enumerated in their employers’ houses.
Immigrants and native whites had very low exposure to blacks (average share .02 and .03,
respectively). Finally, we observe that southern blacks lived on the cheapest land relative to
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other groups, with first–generation immigrants just behind them. The difference in land val-
ues faced by the average black and average third–generation white is a striking $35 ($90.66
versus $125.67 in 1913 dollars) and underscores the importance of controlling for land values
in our regressions.
Table 2.3: Reverse exposure regressions.
As a second approach, we compare the sorting patterns of blacks and immigrants using
a reverse regression analysis to identify the relationship between demographic groups and
land uses while controlling for potentially confounding correlations with other demographic
or spatial variables. We regress land use variables on our slate of demographic variables
and (in some cases) additional controls. Panel A of Table 2.3 includes no spatial or land
use controls; the results can thus be thought of as the characteristics of areas in the cities
where minority groups lived relative to third–generation whites (the omitted demographic
group).20 Panel B of Table 2.3 presents the results of the same specifications with the full
set of spatial controls, including the area of the enumeration district, ward fixed effects,
20We include only our proxy for income, maids per head of household, as a control.
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and distances to the central business district, major street, Lake Michigan, nearest river,
and nearest railroad; these results can be thought of as the urban characteristics faced by
minorities relative to third–generation whites conditional on the particular neighborhood of
the city in which they lived.
The results from these regressions suggest relationships similar to those obtained from the
average exposure exercise. Areas of the city with more second–generation immigrants and
northern blacks had fewer tall structures compared with areas having more native whites.
This finding is consistent with the pictorial evidence in Figure 2.1 showing that second–
generation immigrants lived the furthest from the center city. Whether we look across the
city (Panel A) or within neighborhoods (Panel B), first–generation immigrants lived in the
densest, most commercial areas while southern blacks were exposed to more noxious and
non–noxious manufacturing relative to third–generation whites (see columns 3 and 4 for
first–generation immigrants and columns 5 and 6 for southern blacks). Furthermore, first–
generation immigrants located in more industrial areas of the city (Panel A, columns 5 and
6).
These results underscore the need to control for existing sorting according to land use
when asking how the spatial distribution of minorities shaped the zoning ordinance. We note,
however, that the land use and demographic composition relationships identified in Panel
B are in many instances at odds with the zoning findings we report in the next section,
suggesting that our main results cannot driven solely by pre–existing relationships between
land use and demography that later influenced the zoning ordinance.
2.6 The Impact of Minority Share on Zoning Outcomes
2.6.1 Density Zoning
We begin our analysis by exploring whether density zoning was used as a tool to concentrate
blacks in higher density neighborhoods, a potential precursor to modern day arguments
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regarding exclusionary zoning.21 Because the volume districts were essentially concentric
rings radiating out from the central business district, the key tradeoff is between adjacent
volume categories. We focus on the two outermost rings, which were volume districts 1 and
2 (see Figure 2.5.A). Under zoning for volume district 1, buildings were effectively capped
at 3 stories In volume district 2, apartment buildings could reach as high as 8 to 10 stories.
As a result, volume districts 1 and 2 effectively delineated the boundary between locations
where 8 to 10 story tenements were allowed and locations where residential development
was limited to structures of no more than 3 stories. This boundary represents the relevant
margin for the proto–exclusionary zoning behavior we seek to analyze. We therefore focus
our analysis on the border between volume districts 1 and 2.
Table 2.4: Density zoning results.
To test for a potential exclusionary zoning motive in the location of these boundaries, in
Table 2.4 we report the results from a probit analysis with the outcome variable equal to one
if the enumeration district received a majority of zoning for volume district 2. To make the
results readily comparable across groups, we report both coefficient estimates and standard
errors in units of standard deviations for the relevant demographic variable (for instance, the
coefficient on the variable “southern black” is reported in units of the standard deviation of
21A second potential vehicle through which the zoning ordinance could have been used to advance exclu-
sionary motives would have been through the location of residential vs. apartment use zoning. However, in
practice, residential zoning was restricted to outlying portions of the city in neighborhoods that were not
proximate to significant numbers of black residents. Thus, there is little scope for an empirical analysis of
tradeoffs along this margin.
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southern black share). The standard deviations for each variable are reported in Table 2.1.
Columns 1–4 report the results with the sample consists of the entirety of volume districts
1 and 2. We begin with a simple specification omitting any controls (columns 1 and 2)
and then add the full set of controls for geography, land use, political boundaries, and
economic values (see Appendix Table 2.1 for list) in columns 3 and 4. In the no–controls
specification, the presence of blacks appears positively correlated with higher density zoning
(and second–generation immigrants negatively correlated). However, adding controls reduces
the magnitude of the black effect and shows a precisely estimated negative first–generation
immigrant effect on the likelihood of higher density zoning. The p–value of the difference
between the effects of black share and first–generation immigrant share is .000 (column 3).
These results are consistent with an exclusionary zoning strategy that, at the margin, sought
to create low density neighborhoods for recent white immigrants while containing blacks in
higher density areas where they had settled. We note that the main area of the “black belt”
shown in Figure 2.2 contained none of the lowest density category.
We provide a further test of the exclusionary motive by examining black settlements that
were located outside the main area of the “black belt” and nearer to areas that contained the
lowest density category. In particular, we rerun the model limiting the sample to neighbor-
hoods that were located along the boundary between volume districts 1 and 2 (within 1000
feet of both types and excluding neighborhoods that included any volume zoning other than
districts 1 and 2). Our estimates suggest that either a one standard deviation increase in
black share or a one standard deviation decrease in the first–generation immigrant share was
associated with a 16 to 17 percentage point increase in the likelihood that an enumeration
district received a majority of higher density zoning (column 5).22
We highlight that, in general, first–generation immigrants lived in more densely populated
neighborhoods (see Tables 2 and 3) than did blacks prior to the zoning. This fact implies
22We note that some caution is warranted as these estimates leverage a much smaller number of black
neighborhoods than was the case for the sample which included the entire coverage of volume districts one
and two.
59
that these findings are unlikely to be driven by ex ante sorting and helps to explain why the
inclusion of spatial controls makes such a difference for the estimated coefficients. In column
6, we divide the black population by origin, and our results suggest that the black effect
is being driven by southern migrants (although these findings are not significant). We do,
however, show that the difference in the black and first–generation immigrant effects (column
5) and southern black and first–generation immigrant effects (column 6) are statistically
different at the one percent level, underscoring the differential treatment of the two groups.
In some ways, these findings are unexpected because our reading of the history indicates
that the overarching concern of the zoning board relating to density was to keep skyscrapers
in the downtown area. However, our results also suggest that a pre–cursor to modern–day
exclusionary zoning may be found in the implementation of Chicago’s initial zoning law. At
the time, both European immigrants and black migrants faced housing shortages. At the
margin, the Chicago Zoning Board appeared to adopt a strategy designed to keep blacks in
place through high–density housing. The tendency towards lower–density zoning in Euro-
pean immigrant neighborhoods suggests an expectation that these immigrants would spread
out across the city. Given the existence at the time of public animus towards both recent
European immigrants and blacks, one possibility is that this differential treatment reflected
the 1921 passage of federal immigration restrictions. With the border closing, the tide of Eu-
ropean immigration was effectively stemmed, while the inflow of southern blacks was likely
to continue unabated. Nonetheless, our findings suggest an early form of exclusionary zoning
that was applied to blacks only and altered the trajectory of neighborhood density faced by
minority groups.
2.6.2 Manufacturing Zoning
We next examine the relationship between the size of various minority groups and the like-
lihood of being zoned for manufacturing uses, again scaling coefficients by the standard
deviation of the respective minority group. Turning first to the presence of any manufactur-
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ing zoning in the neighborhood, columns 1 through 3 of Table 2.5 report coefficient estimates
from versions of equation (1) where the dependent variable is an indicator for the presence
of any manufacturing zoning in the neighborhood. We begin with a simple probit model
omitting all controls; this specification can be thought of as the standard environmental
justice regression that does not control for sorting into areas suited for manufacturing. The
results show a significant positive relationship between black and first–generation immigrant
share and the likelihood of receiving at least some zoning for manufacturing uses. In column
2 we include the full vector of controls described in Section IV. Although the pseudo R–
squared rises from .038 to .739 with the addition of controls, the black share effect increases
in magnitude to .053. The first–generation immigrant effect is reduced by 40 percent but it
still significant (.050).
Table 2.5: Manufacturing zoning results.
In column 3 we replicate column 2 with northern and southern blacks included separately.
It is immediately clear from these results that the entire positive relationship between black
share and the presence of manufacturing zoning is being driven by the southern black share.
The coefficient estimates presented in Columns 1 and 2 indicate that enumeration districts
with more first–generation immigrants were also more likely to be zoned for manufactur-
ing uses. The magnitudes of these estimates are economically significant. The results in
column 3 imply that a one standard deviation increase (roughly 13 percentage points) in
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southern black share is associated with an 8 percentage point increase in the likelihood of
an enumeration district being zoned to include manufacturing uses. A standard deviation
increase in the first–generation immigrant share (roughly 22 percentage points) is associated
with a 5 percentage point increase in the likelihood of an enumeration district being zoned
for manufacturing uses. These estimates are particularly large given that only 26 percent
of enumeration districts in our sample received any manufacturing zoning. In Contrast,
northern blacks were less likely to get manufacturing zoning in their neighborhoods. This
finding is consistent with the anecdotal evidence regarding the status of northern blacks in
the zoning process. Neighborhoods with larger populations of northern blacks were likely
wealthier, more exclusive, and better represented by the Zoning Commission. In particu-
lar, contemporary reports suggest that Charles S. Duke, an African American on the Zoning
Commission, actively worked to protecting northern black interests during the zoning process
(Schwieterman and Caspall, 2006).
So far, we have argued that manufacturing use zoning was unambiguously “bad” in
the sense that minority communities thus zoned would face disproportionate environmental
hazards and decreased future home values. However, it is also possible that poor minority
groups benefited economically from living in close proximity to their places of employment
due to lower transportation costs. While we do not believe this is a driving force in our
results, it is possible that within this context a positive value for the indicator may reflect
advantageously located manufacturing zoning at the neighborhood fringe. One response to
this concern is to focus instead on the share of a neighborhood that is zoned for manufacturing
uses. The motivation here is that a positive relationship between minority share and the
percentage of manufacturing zoning may be more consistent with the notion of encroachment
of industry into black and immigrant neighborhoods and a finding that minorities were
disadvantageously zoned.
Thus, we replicate our basic model using the continuous outcome measure, the percent
of the enumeration district zoned for manufacturing. Tobit results are presented in columns
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4 through 6 of Table 2.5. The dichotomy between the experience of northern and southern
blacks is highlighted in these specifications. Overall, a one standard deviation increase in
black share is associated with a roughly 4 percent increase in the area of an enumeration
district being zoned for manufacturing uses. This effect is again driven by southern blacks,
with a standard deviation increase in southern black share associated with an 11 percent
increase in manufacturing zoning. Northern blacks were protected from manufacturing zon-
ing along the intensive margin as well. In standard deviation terms, the southern black
effect is nearly twice as large as the effect on first–generation immigrant share (.112 versus
.068). Finally, we do not see any evidence that second–generation immigrant neighborhoods
were disadvantageously zoned relative to third–generation white neighborhoods on either the
extensive or intensive margin. Thus, our primary finding on manufacturing zoning is that
southern black and first–generation immigrant neighborhoods were more likely to be zoned
for manufacturing uses and tended to receive a larger amount of such zoning.23
Table 2.6: Robustness check on manufacturing zoning results.
So far our identification strategy has relied on controlling for an extensive set of spatial
and pre–existing land use variables in addition to land prices, political influence, and a
23One potential area of interest is the fact that the first–generation immigrant group is itself composed
of immigrants from many countries. In Appendix Table 2.1 we present the results from the indicator and
continuous measures of industrial zoning with the first–generation immigrants further divided by sending
country; these results are also presented in standard deviation terms. We observe that no group was as
disadvantageously zoned for industrial uses as were southern blacks; furthermore, the coefficients on the
share of the enumeration district population composed of the main ethnic groups (Polish, Russian, Italian,
Irish, and German) are all quantitatively similar. Thus, it does not appear that any particular immigrant
group was singled out for industrial zoning in the same way as southern blacks.
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wealth proxy. We may nonetheless be concerned that our findings are driven by unobserved
sorting of blacks and immigrants into industrial areas in a manner that is correlated with
the initial zoning but not fully captured by our specification. To investigate the robustness
of our approach, we rerun the specifications from Table 2.5 on samples of the city that would
provide fewer opportunities for poor minority groups to sort into areas with high potential for
manufacturing. We begin by restricting our sample to enumeration districts with no existing
large–scale or noxious manufacturing uses (manufacturing classes C and S). We then further
restrict the sample to enumeration districts without heavy or noxious uses that are also at
least 500 feet away from such uses. Finally, we restrict the sample to enumeration districts
at least 1000 feet away from any heavy or noxious uses. The results from probit and Tobit
analyses on these restricted samples are presented in Table 2.6. Columns 1 and 4 present
results from the least restricted samples while columns 3 and 6 present results from the most
restricted samples. Results from each of the 3 different sample restrictions are quantitatively
similar to the baseline results presented in Table 2.5.
2.6.3 Commercial Zoning
We next turn our attention to commercial zoning. While zoning for this use was undesir-
able for the wealthiest of neighborhoods that were exclusively residential, poor black and
immigrant populations would likely have viewed close proximity to food stores, shops and
entertainment venues as a benefit and would have viewed proximity to commercial uses as
preferable to manufacturing uses.24 Table 2.7 reports Tobit estimates of the relationship
between demographics and the percentage of the enumeration district zoned for commercial
uses.25
24An African American member of the Zoning Commission, Charles S. Duke, succeeded in removing two
objectionable parts of the zoning ordinance covering the Black Belt, one of which would have extended
a commercial district through Grand Boulevard where most of the “better colored homes” were situated
(Schwieterman and Caspall, 2006, p. 29).
25Commercial zoning was much more prevalent than manufacturing zoning: 86 percent of enumeration
districts received at least some commercial zoning, while only 26 percent received any manufacturing zoning.
Thus, there is little reason to model commercial zoning outcomes using an indicator variable.
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Table 2.7: Commercial zoning results.
We begin with the standard specification without controls in column 1 of Table 2.7 (con-
tinuing to list outcomes in terms of standard deviations). There is no effect of either black
or first–generation immigrant share on commercial zoning while second–generation immi-
grant share is associated with less commercial zoning. However, adding controls addresses
the pre–zoning sorting shown in Tables 2 and 3, and these results are shown in column 2
(black share entered separately) and column 3 (northern and southern black share entered
separately). Column 3 shows that the small negative effect on total black share is driven
by the presence of southern blacks with northern blacks receiving more commercial zoning.
Similarly to the manufacturing results, we also find that first–generation immigrant neigh-
borhoods also received less commercial zoning. We investigate the channels through which
various groups received more manufacturing or commercial zoning in the next section.
2.6.4 Decomposing the Commercial vs. Manufacturing Zoning
Tradeoff
To fully understand the mechanisms through which minority neighborhoods received more
manufacturing and less commercial zoning, we split the sample by pre–existing levels of
manufacturing and commercial activity and reproduce our baseline specifications in Table
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2.8. Panel A presents results by quartile of pre–existing commercial use density, and Panel
B by quartile of pre–existing manufacturing use density. For parsimony, we only present
the coefficient estimates for the enumeration district’s percent southern black and percent
foreign born, again scaled so that the coefficients reflect the estimated effect of a one stan-
dard deviation increase in the given demographic group. The underlying regressions include
the entire set of control and demographic variables that were incorporated in the baseline
specification (listed in Appendix Table 2.1). To give a sense of scale and overall zoning
patterns, we also present the average percentage of the neighborhoods in each quartile that
were zoned for commercial or manufacturing uses. We also report by quartile the number
of neighborhoods whose population is at least 10 percent southern black populations and
greater than 40 percent first–generation immigrant.26
Focusing first on the commercial density decomposition, we note that there is a sys-
tematic relationship between pre–existing commercial density and the zoning of land for
manufacturing and commercial uses. Moving from the first quartile to the fourth quartile
in commercial density (from low levels of pre–existing commercial activity to high levels of
pre–existing commercial activity), the average percentage of a neighborhood that received
manufacturing zoning decreases monotonically from 16 to 4 percent. Furthermore, the aver-
age percentage of a neighborhood receiving commercial zoning increases monotonically from
9 to 36 percent. This decomposition reinforces McMillan and McDonald’s (1999) finding that
Chicago’s initial zoning ordinance was significantly influenced by pre–existing land uses.
The regression results in Panel A also shed light on our finding that neighborhoods
containing larger numbers of southern blacks or first–generation immigrants received larger
shares of manufacturing zoning and smaller shares of commercial zoning, controlling for pre–
existing land uses and geography. The largest concentration of neighborhoods comprised of
at least 10 percent southern blacks occurs in the third quartile of the commercial density
distribution. On average, these neighborhoods received a high level of commercial zoning
26We use a 10 percent cutoff for southern blacks and a 40 percent cutoff for foreign immigrants to charac-
terize the presence of “enclaves” because of the difference in their relative size in the overall population.
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Table 2.8: Decomposition results.
and relatively low levels of manufacturing zoning. However, our regression results for these
neighborhoods indicate that a one standard deviation increase in southern black share is
associated with an almost 10 percentage point decrease in commercial zoning and a 3 per-
centage point increase in manufacturing zoning (relative to baseline averages of 25 percent
and 7 percent, respectively). Thus, the presence of southern blacks appears to be associated
with a significant shift away from potentially more desirable commercial zoning and towards
manufacturing zoning in these neighborhoods.
A second dimension of the manufacturing effect is evident in the first quartile neighbor-
hoods, which on average received high levels of manufacturing zoning. While these neighbor-
hoods contain fewer southern blacks than those in any other quartile, when southern blacks
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are present, they are associated with a significant increase in the level of manufacturing
zoning. A one standard deviation increase in southern black share is associated with a 4.6
percentage point increase, relative to a base of 16 percent. The first–generation immigrant
results are generally similar to those for southern blacks with the exception that we do not see
clear evidence of substitution between commercial and manufacturing in the third quartile
of commercial density.
Panel B of Table 2.8 replicates the top panel with the sample decomposed based on pre–
existing manufacturing density.27 Very little manufacturing zoning was applied in these first
quartile neighborhoods, all of which had no pre–existing manufacturing; on average, only 1.8
percent of these neighborhoods were zoned for manufacturing. The coefficient estimates from
this quartile suggest that a large portion of the manufacturing zoning that did occur in these
areas which had no extant manufacturing activity was concentrated in neighborhoods with
large southern black and immigrant populations. The second quartile reveals a similar result
for immigrants but not for southern blacks, although there were very few neighborhoods with
a large number of southern blacks in this quartile.
Panel B also shows that higher levels of pre–existing manufacturing were generally asso-
ciated with higher proportions of commercial zoning. The largest concentrations of southern
blacks occurred in the third quartile of pre–existing manufacturing, while the largest con-
centrations of first–generation immigrants occurred in the fourth quartile. Both groups were
associated with significantly lower levels of commercial zoning in these quartiles: a one stan-
dard deviation increase in southern black share in the third quartile led to 6.3 percentage
points less commercial zoning, relative to an average of 23.4 percent, while a one standard
deviation increase in first–generation immigrant share in the fourth quartile led to 5.6 per-
centage points less commercial zoning, relative to an average of 33.6 percent. We also note
that for southern blacks, there is evidence that, in the third quartile, they are associated
with substitution from commercial zoning to manufacturing zoning. This last result mimics
27Here, there are 577 enumeration districts with no pre–existing manufacturing uses. As a result, the first
and second quartiles differ in their number of observations.
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the finding from Panel A: the presence of southern blacks led to an overall shift out of com-
mercial zoning and into manufacturing zoning in neighborhoods that could have received
either type based on existing uses.
2.6.5 Impact of 1923 Zoning on 1940 Housing Density and Zoning
Revisions
In Table 2.9 we explore whether inequitable treatment in the initial zoning ordinance had
persistent effects. We begin with the density component of the ordinance, linking the volume
zoning outcome in 1923 to housing and population density from the 1940 census. We are
also interested in the impact of the use zoning ordinance on the location of industrial and
commercial activity over time; however, the limited availability of land use data in the
early twentieth century makes it difficult to undertake a similar analysis for this part of the
ordinance.28 Instead, we digitized the first major revision to the Chicago zoning ordinance,
which occurred in 1942, to examine the persistence of use zoning. We show in a companion
paper (Shertzer, Twinam, andWalsh, 2014) that the 1923 zoning ordinance had robust effects
on the location of commercial and industrial activity in 2005. Assessing the persistence in
zoning over the 1923 to 1942 period thus sheds light on the channels through which the initial
zoning ordinance affected minority exposure to industry and commerce over the ensuing
decades.
Table 2.9: Intermediate run zoning results.
28For instance, the microdata for the census of manufacturers were not generally preserved in the same
manner as the microdata for the census of the population in the early twentieth century.
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For the density persistence analysis, we begin with the sample of 1920 census enumera-
tion districts that were located 1000 feet from the border between the two most restrictive
volume zoning categories from the 1923 ordinance and proceed in a similar manner to our
exclusionary zoning analysis in part a. The population and housing unit density of these
geographic units in 1940 is interpolated using the 1940 census tracts. Our specifications
include the full set of controls for 1922 land use, building characteristics, population density,
geography, and land values employed in the main analysis (see Appendix Table 2.I for the
full list), plus the 1923 zoning shares. Column 1 shows that moving to the lowest density
category from the second lowest (from volume category 2 to 1) is associated with 1.6 fewer
housing units per acre in 1940. The average housing unit density in this sample is 10.9, so
this effect represents a 15 percent decrease with respect to the mean. These results suggest
that zoning had a causal effect on the subsequent development of the housing stock. Taken
together with our results from part a., these findings suggest that black neighborhoods be-
came more densely developed relative to immigrant neighborhoods within two decades of
the zoning ordinance. The effect of lower density zoning on population density is negative
and significant at the 10 percent level (column 2).
Turning to use zoning, we find strong evidence of persistence. Column 3 indicates that
a standard deviation increase in 1923 industrial zoning share is associated with an 18.6
percent increase in industrial zoning share in 1942 (.196*.952=.186) off a base of 9 percent.
The effect is similarly large if we use an indicator for any industrial zoning (column 4), with
the presence of industrial zoning in 1923 associated with a 65 percentage point increase in the
likelihood of industrial zoning in 1942. Finally, we find that commercial zoning is persistent
to a similar degree (column 5). Taken together with our main findings, these results suggest
that the inequitable treatment of minorities in the use zoning ordinance had meaningful
impacts and persisted for decades.
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2.7 Conclusion
This paper examines the introduction of zoning in Chicago and asks whether ostensibly race
blind comprehensive zoning ordinances discriminated against minorities. We find evidence
that neighborhoods with more black residents were more likely to be zoned for higher density
buildings, suggesting that volume restrictions were used as an early form of exclusionary
zoning. We also find robust and quantitatively important evidence that otherwise comparable
neighborhoods with larger populations of blacks or immigrants were zoned disproportionately
for manufacturing, suggesting environmental racism was present in the zoning process. Our
results are robust to the inclusion of an extensive set of controls for geography, existing
land use, land prices, and political factors; it is thus unlikely that sorting of minorities into
neighborhoods suitable for industry can explain our results. These findings suggest that
zoning reshaped the urban landscape faced by black and immigrant residents of the city
of Chicago. Immigrants had selected into more densely populated neighborhoods in the
early twentieth century, but one result of the zoning ordinance was to reduce the density
of immigrant neighborhoods in the future via constraints on building height. Meanwhile,
black neighborhoods were zoned for higher building density along the same margin. Zoning
for higher density and mixed uses meant that minorities were excluded from the economic
benefit of low density, purely residential zoning in the 1923 ordinance in terms of increased
property values. Moreover, greater exposure to industrial uses may have adversely affected
the health of blacks and immigrants relative to native whites. The findings of this paper
indicate that zoning may have played a significant causal role in the adverse experience of
minorities documented in the environmental justice and exclusionary zoning literature, and
further research is needed to study the long–term impacts of land use regulation.
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Chapter 3
Danger zone
3.1 Introduction
Crime is an important determinant of the quality of neighborhoods and cities. A substantial
portion of central–city depopulation beginning in the 1970s can be attributed directly to
crime, and rising crime is associated with neighborhood decline and increased isolation of
minorities within cities (Cullen and Levitt 1999, Morenoff and Sampson 1997). The negative
consequences of these developments, such as deteriorating public services and higher rates of
poverty, are well documented (Bradbury, Downs and Small 1982, Massey and Denton 1993).
A recent estimate found the total cost of a single armed robbery to be approximately $42,310
(McCollister, French and Fang 2010).1 Using this estimate, the total cost of the 31,123
robberies in my sample is $1.3 billion – a considerable economic burden. Street crime patterns
exhibit dramatic spatial heterogeneity, both between and within neighborhoods. Many have
conjectured that land use patterns are an major determinant of street crime, and planners
have embraced the notion that cities can use zoning regulations to shape land use patterns
in a manner that will cultivate safe, vibrant neighborhoods.
1Estimates of the cost of crime vary widely; the estimated cost of an armed robbery ranges
from $18,591 to $280,237 in 2008 dollars (Cohen, Rust, Steen and Tidd 2004, McCollister et al. 2010,
Miller, Cohen and Wiersema 1996). The McCollister et al. (2010) estimate includes tangible and intangible
costs to victims as well as costs incurred by the justice system.
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Since the seminal work of Jane Jacobs, it has become conventional wisdom among both
academic and professional urban planners that mixing commercial and residential land uses
will lead to fewer street crimes by increasing pedestrian traffic and generating more su-
pervision of street activities (Jacobs 1961). Glaeser (2011) has argued that high residen-
tial densities should operate against crime through the same channel. These ideas have
been widely influential in practice; for example, Mayor Bloomberg presided over the re-
zoning of 37% of New York City, much of it for high-density, mixed-use developments
encouraged by these theories (Silverman 2013). Many other major cities, such as Hous-
ton, Texas and Vancouver, British Columbia, have embraced the trend towards mixed–
use and high–density development (Punter 2007, Sarnoff and Kaplan 2007); even smaller
cities such as Sarasota, Florida have pursued rezoning plans to generate greater pedestrian
traffic in high–crime areas through a greater availability and variety of commercial uses
(Carter, Carter and Dannenberg 2003). Anderson, MacDonald, Bluthenthal and Ashwood
(2013) refer to the argument that commercial and mixed–use zoning reduce crime as a
“common–sense notion” and Geraldine Pettersson claims that “most of the present–day as-
sumptions about the relationship between mixed uses and crime prevention appear to draw
heavily on the arguments of Jane Jacobs and little else” (Coupland 1997).
In contrast, criminologists emphasize that mixed uses and high residential density gener-
ate more contact between potential offenders and potential victims. The “routine activities”
theory of Cohen and Felson (1979) argues that direct–contact predatory crime requires the
“convergence in space and time of likely offenders, suitable targets and the absence of capa-
ble guardians,” which is arguably more likely to occur in higher–density, mixed–use areas.
Stark (1987) argues that mixed uses and high density result in greater transience, anonymity,
and “moral cynicism among residents,” reducing neighborhood collective efficacy. This fol-
lows a long tradition in the sociology literature of linking high densities to pathological
behavior (Sampson 1983, Wirth 1938). Additionally, specific commercial uses such as bars
and liquor stores may serve as crime generators (Roncek and Bell 1981). The fact that
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crime is typically concentrated on a small number of street segments and intersections (“hot
spots”) lends further credence to the notion that place characteristics can be criminogenic
(Weisburd, Groff and Yang 2012).2
The empirical evidence for these theories is limited, and existing studies suffer from
a variety of measurement and identification problems. Since crime is an enormously costly
burden on cities, and local governments exert substantial influence over the built environment
through zoning, quantifying the criminogenic externalities of commercial and residential land
use is of first–order importance. To this end, I study the effect of commercial and high–
density residential use on street crime. I develop a unique high–resolution dataset on land
use types in the City of Chicago using a comprehensive 2005 land use survey supplemented
with exact locations and descriptions of every licensed restaurant, (late–hour) bar, and liquor
store in the city. I combine this with detailed, spatially–referenced crime data covering all
reported crime incidents over the period 2008–2013. My sample consists of approximately
20,000 street segments. This fine spatial scale implies that the analysis maps directly to
the theory, allowing me to avoid the ecological inference problems which made the results of
previous studies difficult to interpret. This approach also allows for the measurement of the
spatial scale of land use effects, which has been largely ignored by the previous literature
despite its important implications for the extent to which negative land use externalities can
be mitigated through alternative policing strategies. I am also able to determine the extent
to which the effect of commercial activity on crime is driven by particular uses, which has
not been previously documented.
To address unobserved neighborhood characteristics and reverse causality, I employ an
instrumental variables approach, using the city’s 1923 zoning code as an instrument for
modern land use. I show that historical zoning is a strong predictor of modern land use,
2Sherman, Gartin and Buerger (1989) find that 3% of addresses/intersections in Minneapolis are resposi-
ble for 50% of calls to the police. Braga, Papachristos and Hureau (2010) find a similar result for gun crime
in Boston and show that these hot spots tend to persist over long time horizons. This pattern has been
documented in Seattle and Tel Aviv–Jaffa as well, suggesting that this is a general feature of urban areas
(Weisburd and Amram 2014, Weisburd, Bushway, Lum and Yang 2004).
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and I validate the assumption of exogeneity by showing that unobservable neighborhood
characteristics affecting crime and zoning in the 1920s were not persistent. To identify the
impact of specific commercial uses such as restaurants, (late–hour) bars, and liquor stores,
I apply a spatial matching approach, examining how the level of crime differs within pairs
of street segments that differ in their land use composition but are so proximate spatially
that they arguably share the same unobservable neighborhood characteristics. Previous
empirical studies in this area relied on a very limited set of control variables to account for
neighborhood characteristics. This is the first study to use these more rigorous approaches
to identify the causal effects of land use.
My results indicate that commercial uses lead to substantially more street robberies
and assaults/batteries in their immediate vicinity. However, this result hinges critically on
density: Commercial activity actually reduces street crime in denser areas. The spillover
effect of commercial uses into neighboring areas is negligible for robberies and relatively
small for assaults/batteries. My findings indicate that the effect of commercial activity on
assaults/batteries is driven almost entirely by liquor stores and bars, and that these uses
contribute substantially to robberies as well. Per capita crime rates generally decline with
residential density, a striking finding given that larger cities are known to have higher crime
rates.
The experimental literature on hot spots policing provides some insight into how the
externalities of commercial land use might be curtailed. Randomized controlled trials have
demonstrated that concentrating policing in a localized area of high crime can substantially
reduce violent crime in that area without displacement to nearby areas (Braga and Weisburd
2010). The limited spillover effect of commercial uses indicated by my results suggests that
hot spots policing could be an effective response. Zoning could potentially be used to limit
the number and diffusion of particularly criminogenic uses, facilitating the efficient use of
police resources. My findings on the role of population density suggest that zoning which
favors higher residential density could improve neighborhood safety, and that zoning which
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allows for mixed use structures may be preferable to more restrictive rules that aim for strictly
residential or commercial use. More broadly, my finding that land use is a major determinant
of crime patterns further establishes the importance of understanding this relationship.
3.2 Previous literature
Economists have largely ignored intra–metropolitan variation in crime, instead focusing on
temporal and inter–metropolitan variation (O’Flaherty and Sethi 2014).3 However, there is
an extensive empirical literature in criminology and sociology on the relationship between
crime and land use. This literature is largely descriptive, giving limited attention to the
causal inference challenges present in this context. I review this literature here and discuss
how my work improves upon the existing approaches.
Bernasco and Block (2009) study the location selection behavior of robbers in Chicago
at the census tract level. Their results indicate that robbers frequently choose to offend
in the census tract in which they reside or one which has a racial composition similar
to that of their tract of residence; this is consistent with the interview–based evidence
presented in Wright and Decker (1997). They find that individuals rarely travel far to
offend and that census tracts with greater retail employment are more likely to be cho-
sen. Browning, Byron, Calder, Krivo, Kwan, Lee and Peterson (2010) study the relation-
ship between crime and commercial and residential density in a sample of census tracts from
Columbus, Ohio. They find that, at low levels, an increase in a variable measuring com-
mercial/residential density is associated with more crimes; at high levels, this relationship
becomes negative.
Stucky and Ottensmann (2009) examine the relationship between violent crimes and land
use patterns in Indianapolis. They find that robberies are much more common in commercial
areas, even when the comparison is between commercial areas with above–average measured
3There are some exceptions. Cui and Walsh (2014) show that residential foreclosures resulting in long–
term vacancies increase violent crime nearby. O’Flaherty and Sethi (2010) develop a sorting model to explain
the concentration of street vice (such as prostitution and drug selling) in poor central city neighborhoods.
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socioeconomic status and non–commercial areas with below–average socioeconomic status;
however, they find the reverse pattern for homicides. Anderson et al. (2013) use zoning as
a proxy for land use and study the relationship between crime, land use, and other built
environment characteristics such as physical disorder, territoriality, and the condition of
buildings, sidewalks, and streets. They measure the number of crimes within 100 and 250
meters of each of 205 blocks in Los Angeles County. They match blocks so that they have a
comparable demographic composition. They find that residential zoning is associated with
less crime than mixed–use zoning, and that commercial zoning is associated with substan-
tially more crime than mixed–use zoning.
Sampson (1983) argues that the defensible–space and routine–activities theories support
the idea that high residential densities will lead to more violent crime. He tests this hypoth-
esis using National Crime Survey victimization data combined with roughly tract–level data
on the residential density experienced by the respondents. He finds the expected positive
relationship. White (1990) studies neighborhood permeability and burglary; a secondary
finding is that residential density is negatively associated with burglary rates.
Some studies have examined the extent to which specific commercial uses are correlated
with crime. Using data from Cleveland, Roncek and Maier (1991) document that city blocks
containing bars see substantially more violent and property crime. Bernasco and Block
(2011) study the spatial pattern of street robberies in Chicago. Their measure of commer-
cial land use is derived from retail business counts collected by the marketing firm Claritas.
They focus on a subset of these businesses selected so that the proportion of cash trans-
actions would be high; this subset includes small bars, fast–food restaurants, liquor stores,
laundromats, as well as other businesses. They find that every in–block commercial use they
measure has a statistically significant positive relationship with the number of robberies, as
does almost every adjacent–block commercial use. Of particular relevance to my analysis,
they find that bars, fast–food restaurants, and liquor stores are associated with more rob-
beries. Teh (2008) uses an event–study methodology to show that the introduction of liquor
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stores into Los Angeles neighborhoods with low socioeconomic status is associated with more
violent and property crime.
The existing literature has been largely descriptive, with very limited attention to iden-
tifying the causal effects of land use patterns. In addition to using a much more complete
set of control variables than existing studies, my study is the first to employ instrumental
variable and spatial matching approaches to identification. Land use patterns and crime are
confounded by unobservable neighborhood characteristics such as collective efficacy (Fischel
2001, Sampson, Raudenbush and Earls 1997). Crime also influences land use patterns, lead-
ing to a reverse causality problem (Rosenthal and Ross 2010). The novel historical zoning
instrument employed here is both highly predictive of land use and demonstrably unrelated
to unobservable neighborhood characteristics. The spatial matching approach yields an ad-
ditional verification of my IV results. This multi–pronged approach to identifying causality
arguably lends considerable credence to my findings and improves substantially on the ex-
isting literature.
I build on the existing literature in a number of other ways, using higher quality data as
well as improved measurement strategies. I emphasize the role of population density, which
has been marginalized in previous work, and I study how the interaction of commercial
land use and population density affects crime outcomes. The unique detail of my crime
data allows me to separate street crimes from crimes occurring indoors, which has not been
possible in previous work. Since robberies of commercial establishments can only occur where
such establishments exist, separating street robberies from business robberies eliminates an
clear source of bias. I also consider crimes disaggregated by type, which is advantageous if
different crimes have different relationships to land use, as my results indicate.
My study aggregates crimes to very small units of observation that effectively capture
the land use immediately surrounding the crimes while separately accounting for ambient,
“down the street” land uses. This avoids the numerous problems associated with aggregating
crime and land use measurements to larger geographic areas such as census tracts, the
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standard approach in the previous literature. Higher level aggregation leads to an ecological
inference problem; one cannot use the results to determine if crimes are concentrated close to
commercial uses. Higher level aggregation also eliminates the possibility of determining the
spatial range of land use effects and exacerbates the problem of confounding by unmeasured
neighborhood characteristics.4 I argue that my study is the first to effectively capture the
spatial range of land use effects on crime; the few studies that measured crime and land use
at the block face level failed to account for nearby land uses. When estimating the impact of
specific uses, such as bars and liquor stores, I account for the general commercial character
of the area. This allows me to precisely attribute differences in crime to the specific uses
I consider, which was not possible in previous studies. It also allows me to estimate the
“residual” effect of commercial activity after accounting for particularly criminogenic uses.
3.3 Data
This section describes the seven components of the dataset compiled for this paper. Land
use data is drawn from two sources: A 2005 comprehensive survey of land use in Chicago
and a registry of business licenses. Modern demographic data is derived from the 2010
Decennial Census as well as the American Community Survey. Crime data is derived from
incident report records provided by the Chicago Police Department. Historical zoning data
was geocoded from the original 1923 zoning ordinance and associated maps. Historical
demographic data comes from the 1920 Decennial Census and the 1938 Local Community
Fact Book. Historical homicide data is taken from the Chicago Historical Homicide Project.
Historical land use data was geocoded from a comprehensive 1922 land use survey.
4Aggregating to the census block level, as some studies have done, is problematic as well; crimes that
occurred on the residential side of a block could be associated with commercial uses on the other side of the
block, despite the fact that these commercial uses are not proximate to the crime. Measuring land use at
the block level also ignores the fact that crimes will be directly influenced by land use on proximate block
faces. My approach to defining observations avoids these problems.
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3.3.1 Land use
My primary land use data comes from a 2005 comprehensive survey conducted by the Chicago
Metropolitan Agency for Planning (CMAP). From the CMAP classification I derive the
following mutually exclusive and exhaustive land use categories: Single–family residential,
multi–family residential, commercial (including residential with ground–level retail), indus-
trial, institutional, open space, transportation, infrastructure, vacant, and under construc-
tion. Virtually all of the land in the city is coded as residential, commercial, industrial,
institutional, or open space. The variables included in the analysis are discussed in section
3.4.2.
There are a number of reasons to believe that specific commercial uses may have an out-
sized effect on crime. I obtained data on specific uses from the registry of business licenses
maintained by the Chicago Department of Business Affairs and Consumer Protection over
the period 2008–2013. This registry includes coordinates which were used to geocode the
establishments. I use data on the following license types: “Tavern,” “Retail Food Establish-
ment,” “Late Hour,” “Consumption on Premises - Incidental Activity,” “Package Goods,”
and “Tobacco Retail Over Counter.” I use the particular set of licenses held by an estab-
lishment to determine whether it is a restaurant, bar, late–hour bar, or liquor store.
3.3.2 Demographics
Demographic data is drawn from the 2010 Decennial Census and the 2006–2010 American
Community Survey. The 2010 Census provides total population counts, counts by race and
Hispanic/Latino origin, age composition, and counts of housing units and tenure status at the
block level.5 The 2006–2010 American Community Survey provides data on median house-
hold income, counts of individuals on public assistance, and poverty status. The block– and
block–group–level data was attached to my sampling units via areal interpolation. Census
data and associated GIS maps were taken from NHGIS.
5Census blocks roughly correspond to standard city blocks throughout much of Chicago.
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3.3.3 Crime
Information on crimes is drawn from a publicly–accessible database of crime incident report
data provided by the Chicago Police Department’s Citizen Law Enforcement Analysis and
Reporting system. It includes every instance of robbery, battery, and assault over the period
2008–2013 for which an incident report was filed. Robbery is defined as the intentional taking
of property from a person “by the use of force or by threatening the imminent use of force.”
A person commits battery if they knowingly cause “bodily harm to an individual” or make
“physical contact of an insulting or provoking nature with an individual.” A person commits
an assault when they knowingly engage in “conduct which places another in reasonable
apprehension of receiving a battery.”
The publicly–available data includes coordinates corresponding to the most proximate
address, which were used to geocode the crimes.6 Crucial for my study is the fact that
each incident report includes a brief description of the location of the crime, such as side-
walk, apartment, or small retail store. This location description allows me to isolate street
robberies, assaults, and batteries from those occurring inside businesses.
3.3.4 Historical zoning
To deal with potential confounding between land use and crime, I adopt an instrumental
variable approach, using Chicago’s original 1923 zoning code as an instrument for modern
land use. This was the city’s first comprehensive zoning ordinance. The ordinance estab-
lished districts regulating both land use types (“use districts”) and building density (“volume
districts”). Four use districts were created: Residential (single–family housing), apartment,
commercial, and manufacturing. These use districts were hierarchical, with apartment dis-
tricts allowing residential uses, commercial districts allowing both apartments and single–
family homes, and manufacturing districts allowing any use. Figure 3.1a provides a sample
of the 1923 use zoning map.
6There is no evidence that crimes were coarsely geocoded to, e.g., the nearest street intersection.
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Figure 3.1: 1923 use and density zoning maps
(a)
(b)
Volume districts imposed restrictions on maximum lot coverage, aggregate volume, and
height. Five volume districts were established, with district 1 restricted to the lowest density
while district 5 permitted skyscrapers. Figure 3.1b provides a sample of the 1923 volume
zoning map. Shertzer et al. (2014b) demonstrate that this zoning ordinance had a substantial
causal effect on the spatial evolution of land use patterns in Chicago. This makes the zoning
code a powerful instrument, as I document in section 3.4.3. The specific variables I derive
from the zoning ordinance are discussed in section 3.4.3.
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3.3.5 Historical land use
In section 3.4.3, I use historical land use data as part of a test for persistent unobservable
neighborhood characteristics which may influence crime. I geocoded this data from a com-
prehensive 1922 land use survey conducted by the Chicago Zoning Commission to inform
the process of drafting the 1923 zoning ordinance. This data contains the location of every
commercial and manufacturing use in the city, with the latter subdivided into five subcat-
egories, as well as the location and number of stories for every building with four or more
stories.
3.3.6 Historical demographics
During the late 1920’s, a group of sociologists at the University of Chicago divided the city
into 75 mutually exclusive and exhaustive “community areas.” These were considered “natu-
ral areas,” the divisions reflecting distinct and identifiable clusters of related neighborhoods
(Bulmer 1986). I use fixed effects based on these community areas to partially mitigate
biases due to unmeasured neighborhood characteristics.
The Chicago Recreation Committee prepared an extensive handbook on community area
characteristics in 1930 and 1934 for use by civic and social agencies; the 1938 Local Com-
munity Fact Book that resulted contains data on the share of households receiving public
assistance, which I utilize in section 3.4.3 to argue for the validity of my instrumental vari-
ables strategy (Wirth and Furez 1938). Historical data on tract–level population and racial
composition comes from the 1920 Decennial Census. The data and associated GIS maps
were taken from NHGIS.
3.3.7 Historical crime
In section 3.4.3, I compare historical and modern patterns of homicide to argue for the
validity of my instrumental variables strategy. Historical homicide data is taken from the
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Chicago Historical Homicide Project, which digitized a continuous record of approximately
11,000 homicide cases maintained by the Chicago Police Department over the period 1870–
1930 (Bienen and Rottinghaus 2002). Many of these records contained an address for the
location of the crime. 4,528 of these were geocoded to a specific street address, while another
742 were matched to the nearest street intersection. Of these 5,270 homicides, 4,290 are dated
between 1910 and 1930.
3.4 Methodology
In section 3.4.1, I define and motivate my unit of observation. In section 3.4.2, I describe
the basic empirical approach. In section 3.4.3, I outline my instrumental variable strategy
and provide evidence for the relevance and exogeneity of the instruments. In section 3.4.4, I
present a solution to the problem of identifying the effects of specific commercial uses based
on matching proximate observations.
3.4.1 Unit of observation
The goal of the empirical analysis is to determine the effect of proximate and nearby com-
mercial uses on crime, as well as the influence of population density and the interaction of
these effects. Given a small street segment, I want to determine how commercial uses on the
street segment influence crime, and contrast this effect with that of more distant commercial
uses. Theory suggests that commercial uses may affect crime in their immediate vicinity
by increasing pedestrian traffic and contributing to social norm enforcement via monitor-
ing by business proprietors. Commercial uses may have an effect over a longer range by
generating street traffic that spills over into neighboring residential areas. The ideal unit
of observation should capture crimes and their immediate surrounding land uses while also
measuring proximity to neighboring land use types. For example, crimes that occurred in
front of a commercial establishment should be distinguishable from crimes that occurred in
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front of a home but down the street from a commercial use, and these latter crimes should
be distinguishable from crimes that occurred in isolated residential areas.
Figure 3.2: Sample unit of observation with annulus
Source: Esri, DigitalGlobe, GeoEye, i-cubed, USDA, USGS, AEX, Getmapping, Aerogrid, IGN, IGP, swisstopo, and the GIS User
Community
To accomplish this, I aggregate crimes within small (300–ft–wide) street–centered circles
and measure the land use within these circles. The circles are small enough so that the
land use captured is only that which immediately surrounds the location of the crimes.7 To
analyze the spatial range of effects, I also measure land use in an annulus extending 500 feet
from the boundary of each circle. This captures the effect of “down the street” land uses.
An example is given in figure 3.2.
These (non–overlapping) circles are centered on points selected along the street grid.
Ideally, my sample would cover the entire street area in the portion of the city for which I
have data. However, this is not feasible, since it would be impossible to avoid generating
circles that overlap. The algorithm I use approximates this ideal:
1. Start with all street intersections and midpoints.
2. Drop midpoints within 300 feet of an intersection.
3. Drop intersections within 300 feet of each other.
7This method also ensures that the land use on the sides of the street opposite the location of the crime
are effectively captured, which is not the case when census blocks are used as the unit of analysis.
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4. Randomly sample points on portions of the street grid that are more than 300 feet
away from any remaining points.
The first three steps of this algorithm yield a dense, regular array of sample points in
the majority of the city, due to the ubiquitous rectangular grid street system. An example
is given in figure 3.3a. In the portions of the city with an irregular street grid, the sample
points are less densely packed. An example is given in figure 3.3b.
Figure 3.3: Sampling in regular and irregular portions of the street grid
(a)
(b)
Source: Esri, DigitalGlobe, GeoEye, i-cubed, USDA, USGS, AEX, Getmapping, Aerogrid, IGN, IGP, swisstopo, and the GIS User Community
My circle–level data consists of crime counts as well as land use (including counts of
business types) and housing data. I also measure ambient land use and businesses in the
500–foot annulus. Demographic data is attached to the combined circle–annulus area via
areal interpolation.
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My data covers the portion of Chicago south of Irving Park Road and north of 87th
Street. This is approximately the middle two–thirds of the city and it includes the central
business district, the historic Black Belt, and many of the largely black or Hispanic enclaves
that have developed since the early twentieth century. Since the core of the central business
district and the waterfront are not representative of the city as a whole, I exclude circles
whose annuli overlap the central business district or lie within 500 feet of Lake Michigan.
3.4.2 Estimation: Baseline specification
The main outcomes of interest are counts of robberies and assaults/batteries.8 A Pois-
son regression is the standard approach for analyzing data with nonnegative outcomes
(Cameron and Trivedi 2013). This approach assumes that the pdf of the data generating
process is
f (yi | xi) =
e−e
x′iβex
′
iβyi
yi!
, i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} (3.4.1)
This implies that
E [ yi | xi ] = e
x′iβ (3.4.2)
If this functional form is correctly specified, a consistent, efficient, and asymptotically normal
estimator of β can be obtained via maximum likelihood under standard regularity conditions
(Cameron and Trivedi 2013).9
The primary explanatory variables of interest are the percentage of the circle and annulus
occupied by commercial uses (including apartment buildings with ground–level retail) and
the population density of the combined circle–annulus area. I allow population density to
enter as a quadratic polynomial and I include an interaction between population density
and the percentage of the circle occupied by commercial uses. Annulus commercial use and
8I aggregate assaults and batteries due to the hierarchical nature of incident reporting: Batteries are
a class A misdemeanor in Illinois, so an incident involving an assault and a battery will be classified as a
battery, since assaults are a (lower) class C misdemeanor.
9If (3.4.2) is correctly specified and standard regularity conditions hold, then the quasi–maximum like-
lihood estimator of β is consistent and asymptotically normal even if (3.4.1) is misspecified, as is the case
when overdispersion is present (Gourieroux, Monfort and Trognon 1984a,b, White 1982).
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population density are standardized. Other land use variables include the percentage of
the circle and annulus occupied by single–family residences and industrial uses; the share
devoted to multi–family residences is left as the omitted category. I also include distances
to the nearest commercial and industrial use. These are the primary land use variables, and
I instrument for all of them in the second part of the empirical analysis. I also account for a
variety of auxiliary land uses, such as the percentage of the circle and annulus occupied by
institutional and large–scale transportation uses as well as the percentage that is vacant or
open space.
I include an indicator for whether the circle contains a street intersection, following
the evidence presented by Wright and Decker (1997) that armed robbers prefer to commit
offenses near intersections. White (1990) suggests that neighborhood permeability, defined
as access to major traffic arteries, may have a positive impact on crime, and he provides
some evidence for this hypothesis. To account for this possibility, I include a measure of
ambient street density, an indicator for location on a major street, a quadratic polynomial
in the distance to a major street, and the percentage of the circle and annulus occupied
by a major transportation corridor. The concentration of crime around bus stops is well
documented (see, e.g., Loukaitou-Sideris (1999)), and bus stops are frequently located along
streets occupied by commercial uses, so I include counts of bus stops in each circle.
Other control variables include the percentage of housing units which are vacant, the
percentage which are owner–occupied, the percentage of the population that is black, His-
panic, or under 18, the percentage of households with members over the age of 65, and
the average household size. The share of the population that is black or Hispanic enters
quadratically, and I also include an interaction between these shares as well as four indicator
variables for highly segregated neighborhoods (those with shares black or Hispanic above
90% or below 10%). The percentage of households on public assistance is included, as is the
share of households falling into each of seven bins defined by household income relative to
the poverty level. I include quadratic polynomials in the distance to the central business dis-
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trict, Lake Michigan, the nearest river, nearest railroad, nearest park, and the nearest CTA
station. I also include community area fixed effects to mitigate the bias due to unmeasured
neighborhood characteristics.
For ease of interpretation, reported estimates are average marginal effects of the variables
of interest. For the interaction between commercial uses and population density, I report the
average cross–partial derivative. Bootstrap standard errors for the baseline specification.10
A Poisson regression is preferable to a standard linear regression for two reasons. First,
the exponential conditional mean assumption (3.4.2) ensures that predicted values of y will
be nonnegative. Second, the Poisson model substantially outperforms the linear model in
out–of–sample prediction.11 A negative binomial model is an alternative approach suited to
count data, however it is more complex to estimate and does not offer a clear advantage over
a simpler Poisson model (Blackburn 2014).12
3.4.3 Identification: Instrumental variables
To address the potential endogeneity of land use patterns, I adopt an instrumental vari-
ables strategy, using Chicago’s 1923 zoning code to instrument for modern land use. There
are a number of reasons why one might suspect that unobservable confounders or reverse
causality between crime and land use are biasing the results obtained using the base-
line approach. There is substantial evidence that crime rates are related to (difficult–to–
measure) neighborhood social cohesion (Martin 2002, Morenoff, Sampson and Raudenbush
2001, Sampson et al. 1997). Homeowners have substantial incentives to exert control over
changes in nearby land use patterns which may affect their property values (Fischel 2001).
The extent to which they can do so depends on neighborhood social cohesion, since influ-
10I also estimated these models using the Conley (1999) approach to adjust for spatial autocorrelation;
the standard errors were similar.
11In a 2–fold cross–validation test using counts of street robberies as the outcome, the average out–of–
sample mean squared prediction error of the baseline Poisson model was 72% of that of the linear model.
12In a 2–fold cross–validation test using counts of street robberies as the outcome, the average out–of–
sample mean squared prediction error of the negative binomial model was 103.5% of that of the baseline
Poisson model.
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encing the political process of zoning requires the concerted effort of many residents, which
may be undermined by free–riding. Thus, neighborhood social cohesion may confound the
relationship between land use patterns and crime.
Furthermore, reverse causality is a concern because high levels of crime or rising crime
rates may alter the incentives determining land use patterns. For example, crime may dis-
courage the construction of new high–density residences, or it could lower property values,
encouraging the encroachment of industrial or commercial uses into previously residential
areas. It could also have the opposite effect, diminishing the incentives for new business for-
mation. Rosenthal and Ross (2010) document this kind of sorting behavior by entrepreneurs.
Two other factors merit consideration. To the extent that policing behavior is correlated
with land use due to a common excluded cause, this IV strategy will isolate the effect of land
use patterns on crime. If land use patterns directly affect policing behavior, as they likely
do, then this approach identifies a “net” treatment effect, where police behavior is one causal
channel through which land use affects crime. Land use also influences residential sorting
behavior; individuals with a higher propensity to commit crime may sort towards areas with
certain land use characteristics. If this is the case, sorting is another channel through which
land use affects street crime. Since the goal of the analysis is to understand how changes in
land use policy will influence street crime, capturing the indirect impact of land use through
induced changes in policing behavior and individual sorting is essential.
Instrument set
I include the percentage of each circle zoned for commercial and manufacturing use in 1923
as well as the percentage falling into volume districts 1, 2, and 3, with the omitted density
category comprised of districts 4 and 5. The same variables are computed for the annulus
around each circle. Quadratic terms and interactions between use and density variables are
included as well. A quadratic in the distance to the nearest commercial and manufacturing
zoning is included, and each distance is interacted with its circle’s density zoning variables.
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Each circle use variable is interacted with each annulus use variable.
Estimation
I estimate the model
yi = e
x′iβ + ui
using generalized method of moments (GMM) (Hansen 1982). The moment conditions are
E
[
zi
(
yi − e
x′iβ
) ]
= 0 (3.4.3)
where zi includes the instruments discussed in section 3.4.3 as well as the covariates described
in section 3.4.2, excluding the potentially–endogenous primary land use variables. In par-
ticular, the circle and annulus shares of single–family residential, commercial, and industrial
uses are excluded, as is population density. The distances to the nearest commercial and in-
dustrial uses are omitted from zi as well. To obtain standard errors for the average marginal
effects of interest, I use an m out of n without replacement bootstrap with 50 iterations and
m
n
≈ 1
2
. The m out of n without replacement bootstrap is known to be consistent under
minimal assumptions (Bickel, Go¨tze and van Zwet 1997, Politis and Romano 1994).
There are more moment conditions than parameters to estimate, so Hansen’s J statistic
could be used to test the validity of the moment conditions (Hansen 1982). However, the
effectiveness of this test is questionable; the finite–sample size and power appear to be
complex, nonlinear functions of the sample size, number of overidentifying restrictions, and
instrument strength (Hansen, Heaton and Yaron 1996). The J statistic does provide further
evidence that the exponential mean specification is superior to a simple linear model.13
13GMM estimation of the robbery model on the full sample using the exponential mean specification yields
a Hansen J statistic of 87.36; the same estimation using a linear model yields a J statistic of 161.98.
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Relevance
Table 3.1 presents the F statistic and R2 from a linear regression of each endogenous variable
on the set of instruments outlined in section 3.4.3. It is clear that historical zoning is a strong
predictor of modern land use, and in fact it explains much of the variation in present–day
exposure to different use types.
Table 3.1: IV first stage: Predicted land use using historical zoning
Circle Annulus
Modern land use F–statistic R2 F–statistic R2
% single–family housing 325.492 0.392 514.797 0.505
% commercial 330.164 0.395 229.447 0.312
% industrial 183.142 0.266 303.275 0.375
Distance to commercial use 275.091 0.353
Distance to industrial use 1391.748 0.734
Circle–annulus
F–statistic R2
Population 114.836 0.185
Population2 49.289 0.089
Population × % commercial 35.611 0.066
1% critical value for the F–test: 1.60
Results from linear regressions of land use variables on the historical zoning instruments outlined in section
3.4.3. Regression F–statistics and R2 are reported. Results for circle land uses are reported in the first two
columns of the upper panel, while results for annulus land uses are reported in the second two columns.
The bottom panel reports results for variables measured at the combined circle–annulus level. Models are
estimated on the full sample of 18,712 observations.
However, in the case of multiple endogenous variables, the standard approach to measur-
ing instrument strength is not sufficient. If there is insufficient variation in the instruments
which can be uniquely attributed to each endogenous variable, then predicted values will be
highly correlated and inferences will suffer. Currently, there is no test for weak instruments
in nonlinear models with multiple endogenous variables. Angrist and Pischke (2009) reports
a method for constructing correct first–stage F statistics in linear models with multiple en-
dogenous variables; similarly, Shea (1997) describes a method for adjusting the first–stage
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R2 in this context. I report these results in table 3.2.
Table 3.2: IV first stage: Angrist–Pischke F–statistics and Shea R2
Circle Annulus
Modern land use A–P F–stat Shea R2 A–P F–stat Shea R2
% single–family housing 12.513 0.032 11.859 0.033
% commercial 34.767 0.066 19.463 0.052
% industrial 10.190 0.036 0.044
Distance to commercial use 53.869 0.087
Distance to industrial use 454.282 0.345
Circle–annulus
A–P F–stat Shea R2
Population 5.463 0.018
Population2 11.582 0.025
Population × % commercial 11.257 0.019
Angrist–Pischke F–statistics and Shea R2 for each endogenous land use variable (Angrist and Pischke 2009,
Shea 1997). Results for circle land uses are reported in the first two columns of the upper panel, while
results for annulus land uses are reported in the second two columns. The bottom panel reports results for
variables measured at the combined circle–annulus level. Models are estimated on the full sample of 18,712
observations.
While the F–statistics and R2 are substantially smaller than the unadjusted values, it is
clear that near–perfect multicollinearity is not an issue.14 As will be seen in section 3.5.2,
the standard errors increase when I move from the baseline approach to GMM, however they
are not so large as to make inference impossible.
Exogeneity
The validity of the exclusion restriction implied by (3.4.3) hinges on the assumption that
unobservable neighborhood characteristics which may have influenced crime and zoning in
1923 have not persisted to the present. In this section, I argue that large–scale demographic
14These partial R2 are comparable to the first–stage R2 in some other well–known studies using instru-
mental variables.The first–stage R2 in the Levitt (1997) study on policing and crime ranges from 0.06 to
0.11 (see his table 2). The first–stage R2 in the Angrist and Evans (1998) study on fertility and female labor
supply ranges from 0.004 to 0.084 (see their table 6).
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changes preclude this possibility, and I use historical data on crime, land use, and demo-
graphics to rigorously test for the persistence of unobservable confounders.
Substantial neighborhood transformation has taken place throughout Chicago over the
past 90 years. The closure of the border following the 1921 Emergency Quota Act and the
Immigration Act of 1924 led to the assimilation of the city’s theretofore marginalized immi-
grant population. Deindustrialization and suburbanization following World War II caused
a dramatic shift in the demographics of the city; Chicago lost nearly 22% of its popula-
tion between 1960 and 1990 (Hunt and DeVries 2013). Bursik and Webb (1982) document
that demographic changes in Chicago over the period 1940–1970 were strongly related to
changes in delinquency, which is highly correlated with the crimes I consider. Many of the
most segregated and violent enclaves today are located in outlying areas of the city that
were largely inhabited by relatively high–status second–generation immigrants of western
European descent in 1920 (Shertzer, Twinam and Walsh 2014a).
The unique range of data available for Chicago allows me to present some quantitative
evidence of neighborhood change. As discussed in section 3.3.7, counts of homicides over
the period 1870–1930 (largely concentrated between 1910 and 1930) are available for the
49 Chicago community areas that overlap my sample area. Homicide is a strong proxy for
unmeasured neighborhood characteristics which may influence crime. If the factors that led
to high crime in the early twentieth century are persistent, one would expect to find that
historically high–crime areas continue to see a relatively high level of crime today. However,
the correlation between historical and modern homicide counts is only -0.0465.
Historical data on the percentage of families on public relief in 1934 is also available by
community area. There is strong evidence suggesting that economic conditions influence
crime by affecting individuals’ incentives to offend (Becker 1968, Cantor and Land 1985,
Fishback, Johnson and Kantor 2010). Historical public relief shares can be compared to
modern public assistance shares derived from American Community Survey data. The cor-
relation between historical and modern shares of households receiving public assistance is
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-0.0071. These simple correlations suggest that the character of community areas in Chicago
has changed dramatically.
The qualitative and quantitative evidence presented thus far suggests that unobservable
neighborhood characteristics which may have influenced both zoning and crime in 1923
are unlikely to have persisted over the 90 years to the present. To further validate this
supposition, I develop a rigorous test of the exclusion restriction utilizing the unique range
of historical data available for Chicago.
Essentially, I argue that modern crime in my sample circles should only be related to
historical crime to the extent that historical causes of crime have persisted to the present.
Such causes include (measurable) land use patterns, zoning, and demographics as well as
other (unmeasured) neighborhood characteristics. Thus, if historical crime is independent
of modern crime, conditional on land use, zoning, and demographics, that strongly suggests
that unobservable neighborhood characteristics that influenced crime in the past have not
persisted to the present. This can be formalized most transparently using the language of
causal graphical models; I relegate this discussion to a technical appendix.
Following this argument, I test for a relationship between historical and modern crime
by estimating a Poisson regression of modern street homicide counts in my sample circles on
historical homicide counts. I include only those historical homicides that can be geocoded to
an exact street address. I also condition on the full set of zoning variables I use as instruments
as well as historical land use data (attached to the circle as well as the associated annulus)
and the 1920 population and share of the population that is black; this data is described in
more detail in sections 3.3.4, 3.3.5, and 3.3.6. As a robustness check, I estimate the same
model with street robberies as the outcome, since these are much more common and should
allow for better inference. The results are given in table 3.3.
Columns (2) and (4) present results which include the necessary historical control vari-
ables. With either modern homicide or robbery counts as the outcome variable, the influence
of historical homicides is very small and not statistically different from zero. This is strong
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Table 3.3: Relationship Between Modern and Historical Crime
# of modern homicides # of modern robberies
(1) (2) (3) (4)
# of historical homicides
-0.0001 -0.0002 0.1529*** 0.0252
(0.00341) (0.00436) (0.03871) (0.04032)
Controls N Y N Y
Observations 18,563 18,563 18,563 18,563
Results from Poisson regressions of modern street homicide or robbery counts on historical homicide counts.
Regressions in columns (2) and (4) include 1922 land use, 1920 population and racial composition, and 1923
zoning; see sections 3.3.5, 3.3.6, and 3.4.3 for details. Results are average marginal effects. Sample excludes
some circles for which historical land use data is not available due to damaged land use maps. Bootstrap
standard errors are reported in parentheses.
evidence in favor of the exogeneity assumptions underlying my instrumental variable strategy.
Excluding the historical control variables actually yields a positive and significant relation-
ship when the outcome is robbery counts; this suggests that the test has sufficient power to
detect an exogeneity violation if one existed.
3.4.4 Identification: Spatial matching
In section 3.5.3, I test for the influence of specific commercial land uses (such as bars) on
crime. Unfortunately, the instrumental variable strategy described above is not applicable
here, since historical zoning can only predict general land use patterns and not specific
commercial uses. I adopt an alternative approach, matching sample circles whose boundaries
lie not more than 200 feet apart. I then analyze differences in outcomes between these
matched observations as a function of differences in covariates. Assuming that unobservable
neighborhood characteristics vary smoothly across space, they should be largely constant
between matched observations, so that the effects of differences in land use can be identified.
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I estimate models of the form
yi − yj = (xi − xj)
′
β + ǫij
using ordinary least squares. Observations are paired so that the centroid of circle i is
within 500 feet of the centroid of circle j. The argument is that confounding factors will be
differenced out; this should be the case if unobservable neighborhood characteristics which
may influence crime vary smoothly over space. To gauge the effectiveness of this identification
strategy, I use it to replicate the instrumental variables analysis. Estimation using OLS is
arguably appropriate here since the estimated residuals are approximately normal.15
3.5 Results
I first present descriptive statistics and discuss the spatial pattern of crime in Chicago. I
then present results from baseline Poisson regressions without instruments in section 3.4.2.
In section 3.5.2, I reestimate these models using GMM with historical zoning instruments.
In section 3.5.3, I use the spatial matching approach to study the role of specific commercial
land uses.
Table 3.4: Descriptive Statistics: Outcomes
Robberies
1.7
(3.03)
Robberies (per 1000 residents)
2.6
(6.92)
Assaults/batteries
5
(7.85)
Assaults/batteries (per 1000 residents)
7.3
(14.12)
Observations 18,712
15The residuals display heavy tails due to the right–skewed distribution of crime. However, they are
approximately normally distributed over most of the range of the differenced outcome variables.
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Table 3.4 provides means and standard deviations of crime counts in my sample. Street
crime in my data is highly concentrated spatially. The median number of street robberies
is one and the median number of assaults/batteries is two. 42% of observations see no
robberies at all over the period 2008–2013; similarly, 23% see no batteries or assaults. Sample
points with four or more robberies, the top 13%, account for 56% of the 31,123 robberies
I observe. This is typical of urban crime and has been well documented in other cities
such as Boston, Minneapolis, Seattle, and Tel–Aviv (Braga et al. 2010, Sherman et al. 1989,
Weisburd and Amram 2014, Weisburd et al. 2012).
Table 3.5: Descriptive Statistics: Land Use
% commercial
0.12
(0.27)
% ambient commercial
0.12
(0.14)
Population density
835.4
(426.43)
Observations 18,712
Local and ambient commercial uses as well as population density are the primary predic-
tors of interest in the baseline and instrumental variables analyses. Table 3.5 provides basic
descriptive statistics for these variables. 21% of my sample points contain some commercial
use, 10% contain some industrial use, and 49% are strictly residential. The average popu-
lation in the combined circle–annulus area is 835, with an interquartile range of [529, 1091].
The distribution of population is very similar for observations with and without any com-
mercial uses.
In the matching analysis, I focus on specific commercial uses. In particular, I examine the
effects of restaurants, bars, late–hour bars (those bars permitted to continue serving alcohol
past 2 a.m.), and liquor stores. There are 8,414 matched pairs of circles in my sample.
9.5% of these pairs contain at least one restaurant, 2.5% contain at least one bar, and 2.4%
contain at least one liquor store. Late–hour bars are considerably less common; only 40 pairs
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(0.05%) contain at least one.
3.5.1 Baseline results
Column (1) of table 3.6 reports the baseline Poisson results for street robbery counts. Inter-
preting the magnitudes of the marginal effects of commercial and ambient commercial use
requires some attention to the typical variation in these explanatory variables observed in
the data. Since the circles are small and capture areas within opposing block faces, they
are typically homogeneous, with half of the circles in my sample devoted exclusively to resi-
dential use. Circles that contain any commercial use are frequently dominated by such use.
It is most natural to evaluate the impact of commercial use by considering the difference
in crime between a fully commercial and fully residential circle. The variation in ambient
commercial use is considerably less stark and is more effectively summarized by its standard
deviation, so I standardize the variable; the reported marginal effects reflect the impact of a
one standard deviation change.16
Fully commercial circles are associated with 0.5 more street robberies than circles devoted
exclusively to multi–family residential use. Since the median number of street robberies is
one, this is a substantial difference. A one standard deviation increase in ambient commercial
use is associated with 0.16 additional street robberies. A one standard deviation increase in
population density is associated with 0.47 additional street robberies.
The strong positive relationship between commercial uses and crime in their immediate
vicinity is consistent with the existing empirical literature. The relatively small variation in
street robberies associated with differences in ambient commercial use is surprising given the
small spatial scale and has not been documented previously. The relatively low spillover of
crime from commercial areas to nearby residential areas has important policy implications,
which I discuss in section 3.6.
16The standard deviation of ambient commercial use is 0.14, close to its mean of 0.12, so scaling the average
marginal effect by the standard deviation yields an effect similar to that of moving from a fully residential
annulus to one with the average level of ambient commercial use.
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Table 3.6: Baseline results: Robberies and assaults/batteries
Land use # of robberies # of assaults/batteries
% commercial
0.508*** 1.206***
(0.0907) (0.214)
Ambient % commercial
0.156*** 0.577***
(0.0266) (0.0737)
Population density
0.471*** 1.755***
(0.0393) (0.107)
Population density
× % commercial
-0.105** 0.625***
(0.048) (0.1376)
Model Poisson Poisson
Observations 18,712 18,712
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Results from baseline Poisson regressions of street robbery and assault/battery counts on the full set of
land use, demographic, and geographic covariates; see section 3.4.2 for details. Results are average marginal
effects. Ambient % commercial and population density are standardized. For the interaction term, I report
the estimate of E
[
∂2y
∂ pop density ∂ % commercial
]
, where y is the outcome of interest. Bootstrap standard errors
are reported.
Column (2) of table 3.6 reports the baseline Poisson results for street assault/battery
counts. Fully commercial circles are associated with 1.2 more assaults/batteries than circles
devoted exclusively to multi–family residential use; since the median number is two, land
use appears to explain a considerable proportion of street crime. A one standard deviation
increase in ambient commercial use is associated with 0.58 more street assaults/batteries,
while a one standard deviation increase in population density is associated with 1.3 more
street assaults/batteries. In relation to land use, assaults/batteries behave much like robbery.
The population density results reported in table 3.6 consistently show that denser areas
see a larger number of street robberies and assaults/batteries. However, in per capita terms,
crime rates are shrinking with population density.17 Moving from an average density area to
17I do not normalize outcomes by population, as population density is accounted for in the model. Ad-
ditionally, the per capita crime rate may not reflect the probability of victimization per unit of exposure
time; Balkin and McDonald (1981) show that, when potential victims respond rationally to the possibility of
victimization, this real crime rate may be inversely related to the per capita crime rate. Highly commercial
areas may also see substantial pedestrian traffic from non–residents, so it is not clear how one would interpret
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a one standard deviation denser area leads to a decline in the predicted number of robberies
per 1000 residents from 2.1 to 1.8. The same transition leads to a decline from 6.4 to 5.7
assaults/batteries per 1000 residents. This is counterintuitive given the fact that larger cities
have higher overall crime rates (Glaeser and Sacerdote 1999, Haynes 1973).
The interaction between commercial use and residential density is of independent interest,
as it conveys the impact of mixing residential and commercial uses.18 If the interaction is
negative, one could argue that commercial uses accompanied by residences see less crime than
standalone commercial uses. Returning to table 3.6, it is clear that no consistent pattern
across crimes emerges. The interaction is negative and statistically significant for robbery
counts but positive and significant for assaults/batteries.
In summary, the baseline results indicate a strong positive relationship between com-
mercial uses and street robberies and assaults/batteries in their immediate vicinity. Nearby
commercial uses are associated with more crime in neighboring areas, but this relationship is
substantially weaker. Population density has a positive relationship with street crime counts,
but the magnitude is small enough that per capita crime rates fall with population density.
No consistent relationship between street crime and the interaction of commercial uses and
residential density emerges.
3.5.2 IV results
In this section, I reestimate the models from section 3.5.1 using GMM with historical zoning
instruments for the endogenous land use variables. Column (1) of table 3.7 reports the IV
results for street robbery counts. Fully commercial circles are associated with 0.8 more street
robberies than circles devoted exclusively to multi–family residential use. This estimate is
results from a model with normalized outcomes.
18I report the estimated interaction between % commercial and population density; specifically, the average
cross–partial derivative
E
[
∂2y
∂ pop density ∂% commercial
]
where y is the outcome of interest.
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substantially larger in magnitude that the baseline estimate. The IV estimate of the effect of
ambient commercial use is half the size of the corresponding baseline estimate and not sta-
tistically significant. The IV estimate of the marginal effect of population density is slightly
smaller than its baseline counterpart, strengthening the negative per capita relationship.
Table 3.7: IV results: Robberies and assaults/batteries
Land use
# of robberies # of assaults/batteries
(1) (2)
% commercial
0.836*** 1.67**
(0.2537) (0.7786)
Ambient % commercial
0.064 0.642**
(0.142) (0.2994)
Population density
0.368 2.82***
(0.2246) (0.7282)
Population density
× % commercial
-0.725* -0.567
(0.4357) (0.8462)
Model Poisson IV Poisson IV
Observations 18,712 18,712
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Results from GMM estimation of Poisson regressions of street robbery and assault/battery counts on the full
set of land use, demographic, and geographic covariates; see sections 3.4.2 and 3.4.3 for details. Historical
zoning variables are used as instruments for modern land use; see section 3.4.3 for details. Results are average
marginal effects. Ambient % commercial and population density are standardized. For the interaction term, I
report the estimate of E
[
∂2y
∂ pop density ∂ % commercial
]
, where y is the outcome of interest. Bootstrap standard
errors are reported.
Column (2) of table 3.7 reports the IV results for street assault/battery counts. As was
the case for street robberies, the IV estimate of the marginal effect of commercial uses on
crime in their immediate vicinity is larger than the baseline estimate. However, as I show in
section 3.5.3, this effect is driven almost entirely by a small subset of commercial uses. The
marginal effects of ambient commercial use and population density are also substantially
larger than their associated baseline estimates. The negative per capita effect on population
density is actually reversed here; moving from an average density area to a one standard
deviation denser area leads to a increase in the predicted number of assaults/batteries per
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1000 residents from 6.7 to 10.
Table 3.7 reports IV estimates of the interaction term between commercial use and pop-
ulation density. Unlike the mixed results obtained from the baseline regressions in table
3.6, the IV estimates of the interaction are consistently negative. For robbery counts, the
interaction is substantially larger in magnitude; the transition from fully residential to fully
commercial circles leads to 1.3 more robberies at average density, but 0.5 fewer robberies at
density one standard deviation above mean. The same pattern holds for assaults/batteries:
The residential to commercial transition leads to 3.2 more assaults/batteries at average den-
sity, but 1.6 fewer at density one standard deviation above mean.
Table 3.8: Predicted robbery and assault/battery counts from IV model
Land use
Predicted # of robberies Predicted # of assaults/batteries
(1) (2)
Avg. density, no commercial
1.6 5.9
(0.11) (0.47)
Avg. density, fully commercial
2.9 9.2
(0.38) (1.21)
+1 s.d. density, no commercial
2.2 9.6
(0.33) (1.53)
+1 s.d. density, fully commercial
1.7 8.1
(0.36) (1.57)
Model Poisson IV Poisson IV
Predicted number of robberies and assaults/batteries from the GMM Poisson model of street crime as a
function of the full set of land use, demographic, and geographic covariates; see sections 3.4.2 and 3.4.3 for
details. Historical zoning variables are used as instruments for modern land use; see section 3.4.3 for details.
Table 3.8 reports predicted robbery and assault/battery counts for observations with
different land use configurations. An apparent inverse–U shaped relationship emerges, with
lower–density residential areas and higher–density commercial areas seeing lower numbers
of robberies than higher–density residential areas and lower–density commercial areas. The
robbery count in lower–density residential areas translates to a rate of 1.9 robberies per 1000
residents, while the similar count in higher–density mixed–use areas translates to 1.3 per
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1000 residents. The assault/battery count in lower–density residential areas translates to a
rate of 7.1 per 1000 residents, while the count in higher–density mixed–use areas translates
to 6.4 per 1000 residents. For both classes of crime, higher–density mixed–use areas have
lower crime rates than average residential areas.
In summary, the IV results show a strong positive effect of commercial uses on street rob-
beries and assaults/batteries in their immediate vicinity, with relatively weak spillover effects
into very proximate neighboring areas. However, this effect hinges critically on population
density, so that dense mixed–use areas actually see lower rates of robbery and assault/battery
than average residential areas.
3.5.3 Spatial matching results
The IV results establish that commercial areas have a strong effect on robberies and as-
saults/batteries in their immediate vicinity. In this section, I replicate those results using
the spatial matching approach described in section 3.4.4. I also use this approach to measure
the effects of specific commercial uses such as restaurants, bars, late–hour bars, and liquor
stores. This allows me to determine the extent to which the commercial effect is driven by
specific uses and how this extent differs across types of crime. Observable neighborhood
characteristics vary smoothly over space, so the spatial matching approach employed here
yields measurably similar pairs.19
Columns (1) and (3) of table 3.9 replicate the basic results from the IV estimation.
Commercial uses have a large positive effect on crime in their immediate vicinity, but little
spillover effect.20 Columns (2) and (4) add differences in counts of restaurants, bars, late–
19The average difference in population between matched observations is 1 person, and the standard devi-
ation of the difference is 181 persons. This is small relative to the average population (844 persons) and the
standard deviation of population (419 persons). The average difference in the percentage of residents that are
black (Hispanic) between matched observations is 0.03 (0.01) percentage points and the standard deviation
of the difference is 4.97 (4.35) percentage points. The average difference in the percentage of households that
are owner occupied is 0.06 percentage points, with a standard deviation of 6.39 percentage points.
20The interaction term was excluded to simplify the derivation of marginal effects with differenced out-
comes/covariates. When included in either model, the interaction effect is comparable in magnitude and
statistical significance to the IV results, lending further credence to those findings.
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hour bars (those permitted to stay open past 2 a.m.) and liquor stores across both circles
and annuluses. After accounting for these particular uses, roughly two–thirds of the effect
of general commercial character on robberies remains; however, this effect disappears for
assaults/batteries, indicating that the commercial effect is driven almost entirely by the
specific uses accounted for in the model.
Table 3.9: Matching results: Robberies and assaults/batteries
Outcome
Land use
# of robberies # of assaults/batteries
(1) (2) (3) (4)
% commercial
1.402*** 0.809*** 3.567*** 0.220
(0.230) (0.216) (0.531) (0.535)
Ambient % commercial
0.0354 -0.00133 0.563** 0.288
(0.115) (0.0978) (0.224) (0.248)
Population density
0.215 0.195* 1.376*** 1.244***
(0.158) (0.114) (0.337) (0.375)
# of restaurants
0.155*** 0.942***
(0.0405) (0.107)
# of bars
0.156 2.375***
(0.203) (0.481)
# of late–hour bars
1.430* 11.52***
(0.821) (3.268)
# of liquor stores
1.252*** 4.886***
(0.305) (0.776)
# of nearby restaurants
0.00681 0.0837***
(0.0160) (0.0291)
# of nearby bars
0.0786 0.150
(0.0611) (0.134)
# of nearby late–hour bars
-0.0803 -0.708
(0.232) (0.581)
# of nearby liquor stores
0.00791 0.0414
(0.0835) (0.168)
Model OLS OLS OLS OLS
Observations 8,414 8,414 8,414 8,414
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Results from linear regressions of differences in street robbery and assault/battery counts across matched pairs of observations on the full set
of land use, demographic, and geographic covariates differenced across observations; see sections 3.4.2 and 3.4.4 for details. Columns (2) and
(4) include 8 additional variables measuring differences in counts of restaurants, bars, late–hour bars, and liquor stores across both circles and
annuluses. Bootstrap standard errors are reported.
An additional restaurant or bar in a circle leads to an additional 0.16 robberies; only
for restaurants is this coefficient statistically significant. Late–hour bars have a consider-
ably larger effect; an additional late–hour bar leads to 1.4 more robberies. Liquor stores
have a comparable effect, with each additional store leading to 1.3 more robberies. As the
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median number of robberies is one, this is a substantial effect. The results are similar for
assaults/batteries: Late–hour bars and liquor stores have an outsized effect, while bars and
restaurants have a positive but substantially smaller impact. The fact that liquor stores have
a substantially larger impact than the typical bar is surprising given the focus of the crimi-
nology literature on the role of bars. The large difference in impact between bars that close
at 2 a.m. and those that stay open late is also striking and has important policy implications.
The annulus use results in columns (2) and (4) indicate that restaurants, (late–hour)
bars, and liquor stores all have a negligible effect on robberies in nearby areas; their effects
are restricted to the immediate area surrounding the establishment. The same pattern holds
for assaults/batteries. This is consistent with my earlier results suggesting that the effect of
commercial uses decays rapidly over space.
3.6 Discussion and policy implications
My findings indicate that land use is a major determinant of street crime patterns. The
results indicate that commercial uses lead to substantially more street crime in their im-
mediate vicinity. However, this hinges critically on density: Commercial activity actually
reduces street crime in denser areas. This finding is a partial vindication of the hypothe-
sized relationship between land use and crime suggested by Jacobs (1961). Contra Jacobs,
commercial uses attract a substantial amount of crime, and this relationship is particularly
strong for commercial activities that generate pedestrian traffic at late hours (like bars and
liquor stores). However, this effect is ameliorated by higher residential densities, indicat-
ing that more mixed use areas attract less crime than exclusively commercial areas. The
results suggest that a critical mass of pedestrian traffic may be necessary to create safe neigh-
borhoods. Overall, per capita crime rates are actually declining with residential density, a
striking finding given that larger cities are known to have higher crime rates. My results
suggest that land use regulations which favor higher residential density could improve neigh-
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borhood safety, and that zoning which allows for mixed use structures may be preferable to
more restrictive rules that aim for exclusively residential or commercial use.
The spillover effect of commercial uses into neighboring areas is negligible for robberies
and relatively small for assaults/batteries. My findings indicate that the effect of commercial
activity on assaults/batteries is driven almost entirely by liquor stores and (largely late–
hour) bars. The prominence of liquor stores over typical bars as crime generators/attractors
is striking given the common perception of bars as hot spots of crime. Since proximity to
commercial activity is desirable for a variety of reasons, it is worth considering methods of
mitigating its criminogenic externalities.
There is some evidence that the establishment of business improvement districts, where
businesses pool resources to provide for additional local security, leads to substantial re-
ductions in crime (Brooks 2008, Cook and MacDonald 2011). There is considerable evi-
dence that the particular strategies employed by the police are an important determinant
of their success in combating crime (Braga and Weisburd 2010). As discussed previously,
crime is highly concentrated spatially, and this concentration is generally stable over time
(Weisburd et al. 2012). Numerous strategies have been devised which focus police attention
on these crime hot spots, including directed patrol and problem–oriented policing. There is
a large experimental literature evaluating the impacts of these interventions, measuring their
effects on crime and community relations as well as the extent to which they result in displace-
ment, i.e., the shifting of crime to nearby areas not targeted by the intervention (Braga 2005).
This literature convincingly demonstrates that intensive and problem–oriented policing ap-
plied to crime hot spots can result in sizable reductions in violent street crime without displac-
ing crime to nearby areas or straining the relationship between police and the community
(Braga and Bond 2008, Braga, Weisburd, Waring, Mazerolle, Spelman and Gajewski 1999,
Sherman and Rogan 1995).
The findings of this literature suggest that crime concentrations resulting from specific
uses (like liquor stores and late–hour bars) could be partially mitigated by strategic appli-
107
cations of police resources. However, such resources are costly. Zoning is a powerful and
flexible tool for controlling land use patterns. It could potentially be employed to constrain
the number and diffusion of such uses, limiting the strain they impose on police resources.
The value of hot spots policing is particular high given the limited spillover of crime into
areas neighboring commercial uses.
Future work should focus on the sources of heterogeneity in the extent to which com-
mercial uses drive local crime; why do some commercial areas become crime hot spots while
others do not? The distinction between attracting and generating crime is important as well.
If commercial uses merely attract a finite local supply of potential offenders, an increase in
the amount of commercial activity in an area may affect the spatial distribution of crime
but leave the total amount of crime unchanged. Closely related to this is the question of
how the extent to which commercial uses are concentrated or diffuse influences the overall
crime rate. Jacobs (1961) argues that diffusing commercial uses results in less crime, while
criminology research on offender behavior would suggest the opposite (Bernasco and Block
2009, Wright and Decker 1997). I am exploring this question in ongoing research.
3.7 Technical appendix
In this section, I discuss the theoretical justification for the exogeneity test proposed in
section 3.4.3. Intuitively, I argue that historical crime should only be related to modern
crime to the extent that historical causes of crime have persisted to the present. Such causes
include (measurable) land use patterns, zoning, and demographics as well as other (un-
measured) neighborhood characteristics. Thus, if historical crime is independent of modern
crime, conditional on historical land use, zoning, and demographics, that strongly suggests
that unobservable neighborhood characteristics which influenced crime in the past have not
persisted to the present. A causal graphical model provides a convenient and compact way
to formalize and visualize this argument.
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Figure 3.4 illustrates the basic identification problem: The effect of modern land use LM
on modern crime CM is confounded by unobservable neighborhood characteristics UM . This
is a causal graphical model, which encodes conditional (in)dependences implied by a full
nonparametric structural equation model (Pearl 2009). Arrows can be read as directional
causal statements, so that LM has a causal effect on CM , and UM has a causal effect on both.
Grey nodes denote observable variables while white nodes denote unobservable variables; for
readability, and without loss of generality, I present certain categories of related variables as
a single node.
Figure 3.4: Confounding
LM
UM
CM
A solution to the implied identification problem is the introduction of historical zoning
ZH as an instrumental variable (figure 3.5). If ZH is unconditionally independent of UM ,
i.e., if the dashed link between historical unobservable neighborhood characteristics UH and
its modern counterpart UM is absent (so that unobservable neighborhood characteristics are
not persistent), then the effect of land use on crime can be identified.21 However, if this link
is present, the instrument is contaminated and it is likely that the exclusion restriction does
not hold.
Figure 3.5: Contaminated instrument
LM
UM
CM
ZHUH
21Under additional restrictions on functional forms; see section 3.4.3 for the formal statement of the
identifying assumptions.
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The unique data available for Chicago allows for a strong test of this independence
assumption. Figure 3.6 shows how the zoning variable ZH is embedded in an analogous
historical version of figure 3.4. The availability of geocoded historical land use, demographic,
and homicide data (described in sections 3.3.5, 3.3.6, and 3.3.7) means that the historical
analogs of LM and CM , LH and CH , can be observed. From the graph, one can deduce that
CH is independent of CM conditional on ZH and LH if UH is unconditionally independent
of UM , i.e., if the dashed link is absent.
22 In the language of Pearl (2009), ZH and LH
d–separate CH and CM when UH is unconditionally independent of UM . This suggests that
testing for a relationship between historical and modern crime will provide a test of the IV
exclusion restriction. CH may be uncorrelated with CM conditional on ZH and LH even if
the dashed link in figure 3.5 is present, however this would require a level of fine–tuning that
seems unlikely to occur in practice.
Figure 3.6: Nested IV
LH CH LM
UH ZH UM
CM
22The graph must be correctly specified for this statement to hold, however my argument is robust to a
variety of changes in graph structure. Including an arrow between ZH and CH (regardless of orientation) or
reversing the orientation of the arrow between LH and CH or LH and UH does not affect my argument.
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